THE
# MODERN CHURCHMAN

By identifying the new learning with heresy, you make orthodoxy synonymous with ignorance.—*Erasmus*

A State without the means of change is without the means of its conservation.—*Edmund Burke*

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## THE CATHOLIC MODERNIST MOVEMENT IN BOHEMIA AND MORAVIA

### PART I. THE REVOLUTION OF 1848

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IT MAY BE SAID that there was no other country belonging to the former monarchy of Austria-Hungary where Church reform was being so thoroughly discussed as in Bohemia and Moravia during the eventful year 1848. Helfert, the historian of this movement, claims that ideas of ecclesiastical reform, including the improvement of clerical education, the abolition of the right of patronage, and compulsory clerical celibacy, had by this time ceased to be a matter of professional interest among the clergy, but had also begun to make its impression on the laity.

The spread of these ideas may be associated with two names, First, there was the celebrated journalist, Karel Havlícek Borovsky (1821—1856), who was trained as a theologian and during 1848 opened the columns of his paper, *Národni Noviny* (National Newspaper) to public discussions of reform. The second was a priest, Franz Seraf Náhlovsky (1807—1853), the head of the Lusatia Seminary in Prague.

Havlícek's reasons for espousing the cause of reform were twofold. He had experienced at first hand the miserable situation of the Catholic priesthood of the day, and he wished to help the clergy on humanitarian grounds. Secondly, he was much influenced by the liberal ideas of the Enlightenment. He believed that every individual had the goal of improvement, and as he put it, 'nobody must defy humanity and progress, not even the Church itself'. He regarded the Church's purpose as practical, that is, teaching with the aim of realizing an order based on morality and love.

The ecclesiastical dogmas of the Church were not 'the most important thing' for him, but Church practice. To take care of the purity of the human heart—'be ye perfect as your Heavenly Father'—and to try to reach purity in human relations—'do not do anything to anybody that you would not like to be done to you'—these were the principles which Havlícek saw as the main task for the Church. These were the principles given to it by Jesus Christ himself. He was convinced too, in the spirit of his time, that 'the social idea follows the religious one'. He emphasized, therefore, the purity of the Church, which he regarded as a carrier of the religious idea, and he fought against everything which might harm that ideal-purity.

He therefore rejected ecclesiastical absolutism on the grounds that 'it is the cushion of secular absolutism, for the one is dependent on the other, and when one falls the other one falls too'. He was firmly convinced that if the clergy got rid of Roman absolutism by means of Church reforms, they would help nations and mankind to get rid of political absolutism. He proposed that the Church should be reorganized in a constitutional way into a democratic institution, which would have its ecclesiastical congresses, diocesan conventions and vicariate conferences, where only voting would decide future ecclesiastical policy. The laymen, too, should play their part in these assemblies. He urged, like the Reformers three centuries before, the necessity of understanding everything which was going on in church, i.e. the use of the native language in the divine service, rites, explanations of the doctrine, etc., in preference to Latin. 'Let us provide good schools and the rest will follow,' he wrote. Finally, he urged that every cleric should spend some years as a school-teacher before ordination. This would increase both the numbers and standard of the teachers, and at the same time ensure the abolition of celibacy and the provision of better material for the clergy.

In March 1848 Metternich fell. Havlícek saw in the Czech revolution the overthrow of absolutism in both its political and ecclesiastical forms. The first number of *Národní Noviny* appeared on April 1, 1848, and it promised a hearing to every 'reasonable suggestion' of Church reform. The response was overwhelming. Clergy wrote from the remotest parts of the country, from Mlada Boleslav, Budejovice, Tábor, Cáslav, Rakovník and elsewhere. These wanted—according to Havlícek's own words—'to remove everything from Catholicism, which had quite clearly shown that it was against the intentions of the Founder of our faith; further, to remove everything that represented human accretions, the remains of several sad centuries which for mankind had meant intellectual and physical bondage and, finally, to remove everything which prevented Catholicism from becoming something that a good religion should mean to a nation'.

We cannot, therefore, be surprised when one of the articles published

in Havlícek's newspaper on April 22, 1848, written by an unknown country priest, bearing the headline 'A Word About Important Questions Concerning the Church at Present and in the Future', caused much publicity. It contained not only suggestions for reform, but a fiery appeal not to wait any longer. The time for realizing Church reforms had come. The writer demanded, first, a quick vote in their favour in the Constituent Parliament which had been convened not long before, and then the introduction of these reforms into Church practice in Austria. A day or two later, a great demonstration took place near the White Mountain in Prague as part of the preparations for the 'Slavonic Congress' called by the revolutionaries. The 'descendants of the Hussites' appealed to the 'faithful Bohemian people' to follow 'people's priests only'—only those who subscribed to the principles of reform.

On April 28 a remarkable article appeared in the German-language *Const. Prager Zeitung*. The writer spoke enthusiastically in favour of reform. It had roused the people from slumber. 'In spite of the fact that many an "over-delicate hierarchical intriguer" might be unpleasantly affected by this article, much good from it could come to the people!' These words were remarkable owing to the fact that they were publicly written by a serious-minded representative of the ecclesiastical circles in Prague, the head of the so-called Lusatia seminary, Francis Seraf Náhlovsky.

At this time Náhlovsky was considered a moderate and not one to show any particular interest in Church reform. The appeal, however, in *Národní Noviny* offered him the chance to show his hand. He had gone through a long period of development and inner struggle, conflict between his position in the Church and his sympathy for popular revolutionary ideas. Now the events of the spring of 1848 freed him from natural shyness and put him into the forefront of the movement for reform.

How had this come about? His own writings and the documents compiled later by the ecclesiastical and police authorities throw light on his development. For the previous ten years he had been head of the Lusatia seminary. He had lived mainly among the ecclesiastical aristocracy and the middle-class intelligentsia, but he had never renounced his simplicity nor his origin as the son of a poor miller from the district of Turnov. Moreover, from 1830 onwards the Bohemian middle-classes had begun to interest themselves in industry, especially in textile manufacture. And with this, political power began to pass from the exclusive control of the feudal nobility to the richer members of the middle-class. Náhlovsky observed and sympathized with this movement. Like the Bohemian liberal and nationalist Professor B. Bolzano, he saw it as a means of exerting pressure against the over-powerful German element in the country. Gradually, however, his sympathies began to extend to the emerging industrial lower classes, and this sympathy was strengthened when, on the

outbreak of the 1848 revolution, the leading members of the Czech middle-class remained on the whole both politically passive and religiously conservative. Náhlovsky realized that his hopes for Church reform were bound up with popular national aims.

Before acting, he confided with his personal confessor and friend, Dr. F. S. Schneider, then religious head of the technical secondary schools in Prague. This priest was a former tutor in the family of Count F. Thun of Decín and was acquainted with the newly-appointed governor of Bohemia, Count Leo Thun. He had much to tell about the real state of affairs in the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. Schneider also knew the nationalist writer Palacky (1798—1876), whose friend, tutor and adviser he was, and he had access to socialist literature which was being smuggled occasionally into the country. With his advice Náhlovsky set about organizing Church reform through the collective action of priests. On May 18, 1848, he convened representatives of the higher, lower, secular and monastic clergy in Prague to the hall of the Lusatia seminary to discuss a programme of reform.

A full account of this meeting has survived. It throws light on how far, under the impetus of the Czech national movement, the reform movement within the Roman Catholic Church in Bohemia was prepared to go. Thirty-seven clergy attended, including Dr. Jacob Beer, Grand Master of the Knights of the Cross, Ignatius Jaksh, Provost of St. Guy's Cathedral, Dr. Schneider, Dr. Ignatius Rother, Abbot of the St. Margaret monastery, and professors of the theological faculty of the university. Náhlovsky addressed them. 'Religion,' he said, 'must have in mind the real aspirations of the people, and if it did, people would respond to it. It not, it would be laid aside as something unnecessary. He feared that the Catholic Church, as the representative of one tendency among the Christian religions, cared too little for the connection between religion and life, particularly the lives and needs of the common people. The Church had remained backward so far as concerned education and social questions. Now was the time to catch up.' The purpose of the meeting he had called was to enable the priests of Prague to consult on what should be reformed, and whether there were any means of doing this.

Náhlovsky's words of introduction were listened to in absolute quiet. After he had finished, there was only one objection, namely, whether such an unofficial meeting had any right to discuss these serious problems which concerned the whole Church, and whether it would not be better to discuss them at the priests' synod convened by the archbishop himself. Náhlovsky replied that the meeting should certainly be ready to proceed to more formal discussions. The present was the time to make suggestions. He pleaded for a better spirit among the clergy as a means of removing the existing servility and unpopularity of the Church, and then urged specific reforms.

(1) Reform of the liturgy, including the 'reasonable revision' of the mass books and breviaries and the introduction of the Czech language into the services.

(2) That Church property should become the property of the community, the clergy, however, being paid from allocations out of the rents and profits. The rest should be reserved as a fund for the payment to the poor and sick in the dioceses and also financing Church institutions.

(3) That there should be an increase in the number of cures, and possibly the establishment of new dioceses. This would lead to a better supervision of the religious Orders.

(4) That there should be one Czech cardinal who would defend his country's interest in the Papal Curia.

(5) Metropolitans should be elected by the clergy in accordance with former ecclesiastical regulations.

(6) The question of fasts, celibacy and almsgiving should be investigated by a full Council of the Bohemian Church.

(7) That these ideas should be propagated in a special journal called *Archives for the Reform of the Church*, and by regular conferences among the clergy.

Some of these ideas were far-reaching, and went beyond what some of those present were prepared to accept. The Grand Master of the Knights of the Cross, Dr. Beer, rose and asked for permission to speak. He said pungently that he did not agree with the general contents of Náhlovsky's suggestions for reform, for he had found out that in the Church, activities must be seen in all their aspects, and there were also regulations in existence intended to reduce the number of unfaithful priests. These words had a dampening effect on the convention. Those present, as though awakened from their rosy dreams of reforms, started to exchange distrustful looks—and the result was that the frightened prelates asked Náhlovsky first to consult the archbishop and ask him for his opinion. When they knew this, they could continue too. Náhlovsky should report to them about his talks with the archbishop at the next meeting, the date of which was fixed for May 22, 1848.

Next day Náhlovsky went to the archbishop, Baron Schrenk. He found him in a bad mood, but persuaded him to read and comment on each item. Then the memorable argument took place and the archbishop declared: 'It is illusory for priests to ask freedom of action from their bishops, as long as the bishops have no freedom in their relations with the Pope; as far as the issue of making the Church property public is concerned, it would be better for the moment to shelve these ideas, which might cause further trouble; to convene priests' conferences and to have public consultations was not the task of priests, who should better devote more time to meditations and exercises; the best thing would be, said the archbishop

at the end of the discussion, not to occupy oneself with the possibilities of reforms in the Church at all. And when the non-ecclesiastical press busies itself with these issues, Náhlovsky could rest assured that he as Archbishop would notice them and would arrange everything necessary "as the bishop designed by the Holy Spirit to control the Church".'

On May 22, 1848, Náhlovsky told the priests, who assembled again at the Lusatia seminary, though in smaller numbers than before, the views of the archbishop. It was quite clear that the reform suggestions had not been favourably received, and that they would be pigeonholed. Praeses Náhlovsky, however, was not a man to give up. Reform in the Church was, he believed, a necessity. In time of general change and reforms, brought by the year 1848, not even the Church would remain untouched. Whether the Church wanted it or not, it could not escape this process. The only question was, would the Church reform itself, or be reformed.

An article written in this spirit appeared in the magazine *Bohemia* on May 25, 1848, the anonymous writer of which can rightly be supposed to be Náhlovsky himself. The series of articles which followed in *Narodní Noviny* and in *Const. Prager Zeitung* had confirmed that Náhlovsky was not alone in holding such daring views. The correspondent of the *Wiener Donau-Zeitung* in Prague was justifiably astonished by the power of the reform movement among the Bohemian priests, and had described the meeting at the Lusatia seminary as 'the beginning of the Church's revolution'. In this general commotion the press was astonished at the fact that the Archbishop of Prague and the whole Bohemian episcopate were silent. the magazine *Brünner Katholische Zeitung* published at Brno expressed the fears of the conservatives that 'many of the pillars of the Church had risen in this time even against the most sacred institutions'.

The days, however, of the Catholic reform movement were numbered. In this hubbub of confused counsels and half-measures, the Imperial armies and their commander, Count Windischgrätz, had the final word. June 12 opened in Prague with the 'Slavonic Mass' being said in the Horse Market by the anti-Jesuit priest, J. Arnold, to celebrate the opening of the Slavonic Congress. This congress had been called to symbolize the fraternization of all Slavs. Shortly after, fighting broke out between the citizens and Windischgrätz' forces. Fifty fell killed or wounded at the first volley. Desperate but futile resistance followed. Many of the Catholic reformers followed the excited crowds to the barricades. For example, on the square before the church of Saint Mary, the Franciscan Friars helped people to build the barricades, with the priest Hyeronym Jelínek at the head. In the streets 'Pod Karlovem', two Bendictines, Jan Pátek and Otomar Jeklín, helped the people, together with other priests and friars. And while in Prague the blood of brave men and women was being shed, in the country, the priest, J. Smidinger (1801—1853), agitated

for the revolution, and many Catholic priests, inflamed by his example, appealed to the excited people to help Prague. But Windischgrätz's forces soon defeated the Prague revolution. The Slavonic Congress adjourned, the promised constitutional liberties were not given to the people, and the newly-elected Bohemian diet was not convened at all. With the revolution suppressed came an end of the free activity of the progressive priests all over the country. Many were placed under police supervision, others were persecuted by both Church and State authorities of the reactionary monarchy of Austria, and some of them were imprisoned.

Under these circumstances many a revolutionary, as well as reforming endeavour in our public life, was suppressed by the reaction which now came to power in our country. Many politicians, such as Palacky, were removed from public life. Representatives also of the Panslavonic and national orientation, such as Safarík, were threatened by persecution. It stands to reason that the originators of the 'Church revolution' had to be prepared for the worst. Even before the suppression of the Prague revolution Náhlovsky had received a letter from the Bishop of Budysín, Dittrich, blaming him for using the rooms of the seminary for the meeting of the priests of Prague without his consent. On June 5 Náhlovsky received another letter, this time from the Bishop of Litomerice, Hill, containing a friendly invitation to come and talk with him about his suggestion for reform. But at the same time Bishop Hill dictated another letter intended for his canon, F. Schwarz, ordering him to enforce the usual Church punishments against Náhlovsky. As a result of this letter Praeses Náhlovsky, together with his friend R. Rezác, were arrested and imprisoned in the prison of Saint George at Hradcany castle. He was kept in close custody until July 1, 1848. A press campaign was opened against Náhlovsky, and his supporters rapidly fell away. He was criticized for 'bolzanism' and infidelity. On August 19, 1848, Bishop Hill asked him to make a solemn confession of faith according to the Tridentine Council. As Náhlovsky did not do so immediately, his colleagues attacked him still more furiously. The Lusatia priests even forced Dittrich to remove Náhlovsky as head of the Prague Lusatia seminary. At length, on September 14, 1848, Náhlovsky submitted and signed the confession of faith. None the less, he was removed from office.

The remainder of his life was spent in a minor post assigned to him by Dittrich, then by a period of exile in Dresden. There he contracted tuberculosis. He returned home to his native Turnov and died on June 11, 1853, just before his nomination to a country cure at Cerné on the river Sazava. His friend Havlícek Borovsky continued to support his ideas in the pages of *Národní Noviny* until the middle of 1849, but then gave up the struggle as hopeless. He too was sentenced to deportation two years later.

The bishops soon regained the initiative, and they set about suppressing

the stirrings of reform among the Bohemian priests. None of these bishops was in fact a Czech by birth. Archbishop Baron Schrenk of Prague was a Bavarian who spoke no Czech. Episcopal conferences continued during the autumn and winter of 1848-49, encouraged by the reactionary constitution which was proclaimed in March 1849. Finally, the results of their deliberations were published in a pastoral letter published on June 17, 1849.

The contents and the results of these conferences can best be seen from the common 'pastoral letter' of the bishops which was published on that day. The bishops, overwhelmingly members of the Austrian aristocracy, decisively condemned the revolutionary movement in the monarchy of Austria-Hungary as a 'godless instigation of our time which is trying to overthrow all the divine and human order'. They then attacked the reforming efforts of the Bohemian and other priests, calling their efforts 'a cunning incitement' which was able to inflame in man his 'dark inclinations' till he was willing to 'set fire even to his own house so that the house of his neighbours might burn down too'. Typical perhaps of their views was a statement by the archbishop, Prince Schwarzenberg, who said of the national Bohemian consciousness that 'there is nothing progressive in developing this consciousness; on the contrary, this can be regarded as a reactionary step away from the real, moral, Christian nobility back to the dark barbarian age of the old heathenism, which will merit eternal tears; for nationality is becoming a golden calf'.

Thus the first effort at reform within the Catholic Church in Bohemia ended in utter failure. The hierarchy, composed ever since the Thirty Years' War of foreigners and Austrian nobles, had no understanding or sympathy for the national Czech cause. The reformers themselves had too little time to organize opinion, and as the Lusatia conferences showed, were timid and divided among themselves when it came to action. It was nearly half a century before reform became once more a live issue within the Catholic Church of Bohemia.

# THE FUTURE OF THE WORKER PRIESTS

By Emile Poulat,
translated from the French by H. C. Snape

Much has been written about the worker-priests in France and much more said about them. But there were only one hundred of them after ten years' existence when the Vatican caused them to be disbanded. This extraordinary enterprise falls within two dates, one of which was propitious and the other ill-fated. On July 1, 1943, Cardinal Suhard, Archbishop of Paris, resolved to found the *Mission de Paris*; on March 1, 1954, the period within which the worker-priests had to give up their work expired.[1]

I shall not dwell much on the past, although much might still be said from the sociologists's, if not from the journalist's, point of view. But the past will not repeat itself: history never takes the same road twice. The reflections which follow are made with an eye on the future.

It is necessary first to make several preliminary observations. In the first place let us recall the atmosphere prevailing at the start of the experiment. The war was not yet ended, but Nazism was in its last months: men were secretly preparing for the end, united together without any distinctions, and standing together shoulder to shoulder. It was plain that the liberation would not be accomplished without many profound changes. A quasi-prophetic enthusiasm prevailed, and it was by no means confined to young, inexperienced priests. A Jesuit who was a well-known preacher at retreats for priests proclaimed, 'The old forms are going to fall into dust'. The eminent preached before the war at Notre Dame, Mgr. Chevrot, who was also the curé of an important parish in Paris, wrote to the Abbé Godin, 'The rechristianization of France, and especially of the lower classes, must begin with a radical reform of society. First of all, the slave-status of the proletariat must be completely destroyed. . . . The Church of France will have to accommodate itself to this revolution. The part which it will be called upon to play is no mean one, but is commensurate with its share of responsibility for the social abuses resulting in the de-christianizing of our country. It is doubtful if the hierarchy of its own accord will have the courage to embark on these reforms. God will have to come to the Church's aid or compel it to act . . . ' Thus men voluntarily surrendered themselves to the enthusiasm of the Holy Spirit instead of

[1]Two books appeared respectively on these dates: Henri Godin and Yvan Daniel, *La France, pays de mission?* Lyon-Paris, ed. du Cerf, 1943, 161 pp. (The French edition reached 100,000 copies. A very accurate adaptation in English was made by Maisie Ward, 'France pagan?'. London: Sheed & Ward.) *Les prêtres ouvriers*, Paris, ed. de Minuit, 1954, 290 pp. (A collection of documents published by the worker-priests who remained at their post. English translation: *The Worker Priests*, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1956, 204 pp.) In addition, I would refer to my *'Notes sur la psychologie réligieuse des prêtres ouvriers', Journal de Psychologie normale et pathologique*, 1957, I, pp. 51-66.

placing their trust in the proved solidity of traditional forms and institutions.

The Abbé Godin, who was pioneer in the undertaking, expressed on January 17, 1944, his acute sense of the material and moral misery of the dechristianized masses. 'The work,' he wrote, 'would demand patience and persistence.' But at the same time he reckoned that the deserted masses were malleable material, hungry for the gospel, provided that it was presented to them in simple and concrete language; all that was required was to let down the net and there would be a miraculous catch.[2] But this evangelistic optimism faced a tough obstacle in the middle-class outlook of the traditional parish, which was no more able to absorb new converts from the working-classes than to understand a Chinaman or an Eskimo. Consequently a priest was almost condemned to choose between two social strata which cannot mix, and involving separate cultures and different ways of living and thought. The choice is radical and definite. 'A Missionary usually cannot adapt himself to a new environment. In the Mission to Paris, if you give it your complete loyalty, you may possibly find that later on you cannot undertake something else,' he told his first recruits. If you become a barbarian with the barbarians, you cannot return to being a Greek with the Greeks.

The missionary envisaged by the Abbé Godin would be, above every thing else, the herald of the pure Gospel to the poorest of the poor. It is a conception laden with memories for the historian[3] and bristling with problems for the theologian: it is disturbing and even aggressive regarded from an orthodox point of view, and yet one which no one thinks of worrying himself about.[4] Superficially transparent, it is really ambiguous. In short, the Gospel is not only discourse but life, the needs of which cannot be discovered from the written word, but only from contact with concrete reality. The poverty demanded by the Beatitudes has assumed many varied forms throughout the ages; it could be canonized by the monastic rule, but this is not the kind of poverty which authentically proclaims the gospel to the proletariat of our large industrialized cities. The poverty, which will be understood in a system organized continually to increase production and in a collective environment, is not some ideal voluntary privation. The pure gospel is not the fruit of a new interpretation, but a veritable *kenosis*;

[2]The Abbé Godin had more experience of youth than of adults; also, under the German occupation, all labour organizations were proscribed and many of their leaders wer arrested or driven underground.

[3]There comes to mind the mediaeval movement of the *Spirituals*.

[4]*France, pays de mission?* caused a considerable conflagration among French Catholics, but it was a shot with a narrow field of fire. Its criticism was spectacular, but very limited in range: it is confined to the level of teaching, in spite of the efforts of Catholic Labour Action, and to a small sociological field, treating the parish as a closed social environment: it never takes a wider sweep.

the priest must in his turn deprive himself of his cultural environment; he must give up the social position with which his priestly vocation has become identified in order to live with the poor and share their fate.

Authentically, to preach the gospel is not therefore in its essence to prune it with commentaries which are themselves open to question and cannot be assimilated by the masses: it is primarily to restore to it its power of fermentation long quenched by attitudes which have become so dear to us. The missionary should be the first one to be converted: he does not proclaim a truth for which he has the formula, but the transformation of the whole man. Of this he must be the proof which has slowly matured. That is where the ambiguity which I have previously mentioned is so plain. The spiritual ideal put out by the Abbé Godin is defined by a rejection of inferior realities, and at the same time by an appeal to the *whole* man[5]: it is like an angel who has been compelled to become incarnate and finds himself caught up in the tension of two conflicting logics.

The Abbé Godin died on the very day the Mission to Paris began, and never saw the first worker-priests. The plan had been submitted to him, did it not meet with his approval. Perhaps he would not have been able to resist it for long: while it did not come within his perspective, it was clearly a result of his action. In the same way we meet here the source of the ecclesiastical difficulties with which the worker-priests were subsequently faced. But before the difficulties between them and the Catholic hierarchy came to a head, they always had the feeling that they were being drawn in different directions or, to put it less dramatically, they saw before them a chain of demands following one upon the other with their own inexorable logic, which had not been foreseen at the start. How can one seriously share the lot of the poorest of the people by living on air or on subsidies provided by the middle-classes? These people have their own concrete character: they are not down-and-outs to whom charity has been given to bring them within the reach of a church; they are workmen involved in the mechanistic set-up of big industry, organized to defend their rights, struggling for a better world with greater comradeship, and in their French environment under the powerful influence of communism.

In this way two novel steps were taken. The first was to become detached from every kind of service associated with the classical pattern of the ministry in order to plunge into the life of the masses; the second was to share without any reservations the life of the working-man, with the inevitable result of becoming involved in the communist system. These decisions were made slowly and painfully, with much hesitation and uncertainty after heated argument and without any preconceived ideas.

[5]The spiritual which Catholicism opposes to the temporal should rather be defined as a *compromise*: this has created a historical dialectic of a different kind.

Not only were the priest-workmen involved: there was heated opposition to them and heated support for them. In 1945, on the basis of strong denunciations, the Holy See expressed grave anxiety to Cardinal Suhard. Ten mouths later the Holy Office asked for replies to a precise questionnaire. Interventions of this kind were periodically renewed until in August 1953 it was learnt that Rome was going to take drastic measures. The French bishops, who were interested, defended their priest-workmen: they only managed to save a semblance of manual labour, i.e. three hours a day. More than half of the priest-workmen refused these terms: the rest submitted in the hope that the measures would be repealed and, while they waited, many refused offers to take ministries of a regular type.

Since then five years have passed, and the storm created by this affair is far from dying down. According to one's point of view, a great hope has been dashed or a dangerous threat avoided; the problem, however, remains alive in its entirety. What chance have we of seeing a renewal?

As soon as the priest-workmen had been suppressed, it was announced that the idea of 'Priests for the Mission to Labour' was being broached. All that could be learnt showed that the authorities had not succeeded in going beyond the blue-print stage or making administrative arrangements. Gradually, with the good-will of their bishops, a number of these priests returned to full duty, and so seemed to become 'lost men' while waiting for a ruling which did not come. It was said at the time that as long as Pope Pius XII was alive there was no hope. The advent of his successor has perhaps opened the way: he has, however, as yet given no solution to the problems raised.[6]

Thus it is shown that, if the worker-priests have not been pliable material in the hands of the bishops, the decisions made at Rome have only complicated their task: perhaps that is due to the fact that the Vatican, whose hostility to the experiment has never wavered, has drawn the attention of the French bishops to aspects of the problem which they had ignored. It is well known that three cardinals went to Rome in November, 1953, and they returned to make it plain that they were convinced by Pius XII's point of view.

[6]Cardinal Feltin, Archbishop of Paris, said after the conclave to an Italian hebdomadary: 'I am certain that a *missionary apostolate* to the working-classes is needed just as much as missions to distant lands, as the workers are far removed from us. Pius XII considered that the worker-priest movement was not the best way to attain this end, and asked us to think out other ways and means. His Holiness John XXIII is fully aware of the problem with which we are faced and knows the difficulties. My predecessor, Cardinal Suhard, talked to him about this question when he was nuncio at Paris; but Cardinal Roncalli never gave any opinion. Later on, then, we shall ask John XXIII what we can do; we shall tell him of our experiences and inform him of our intentions. If he does not approve of them, we shall begin our studies afresh, and with better ideas shall go on looking for the best approach' (*Epoca*, November 9, 1958).

It is tempting to think that these difficulties were primarily political. This idea has been maintained: in my estimation it does not reveal the real nature of the problem. It is true that the worker-priests were noted for their left-wing views, and particularly for what is perhaps a somewhat surprising attitude towards communism. Truth compels me to say that their attitude was, generally speaking, much more covert than was stated; in the realm of political struggles, this reserve may appear to be formal: in the realm of religious psychology it is essential. Further, Pius XII never condemned the worker-priests for philo-communism, but because in his view they compromised the purity of the catholic priesthood. Also, it is possible that in the politics of the Vatican anti-communism plays a much more positive part than appeared in France: it should be observed that anti-communism cannot be divorced from a theology and ecclesiology much older than communism. Communism has given the conflict between the Church and the 'modern world' a much sharper turn: it did not create the conflict; it has shown itself to be a particularly efficacious catalyst: it does not appear to have created specific religious problems. It does not look as if there was any difficulty here to prevent the new 'Mission to Labour' from making a start.

It must the be recognized that these difficulties are at bottom religious.[7] I can only mention them briefly, though each could fill a book by itself. I will make use of a metaphor borrowed from space-rockets, and suppose that there are three stages. The first consists of the formal status to be given to those priests who will embark on a new experiment on the basis of the experience provided by the first one. The second derives from the calls which have come to the worker-priests from the very heart of their condition as workmen; the third comes from the forces of resistance, which were not created by any formal status, but to which they were all more or less related. (1) At first sight, in strict logic, it would appear as if the problem of their formal status ought to come last after the appeals and resistances which I have just mentioned have been analysed. This may be the way the worker-priests who have declined to submit look at things: it cannot be that of the Catholic hierarchy, who mean to keep a control on the new venture which they failed to do on the first one, and who, while they will make the minimum concessions for adaptation, mean to hold fast to the traditional methods of Roman strategy and the principles inspiring it.

The Catholic priest is a social type well defined by his clothes, his

[7]The relationship between politics and religion, the temporal and the spiritual, is the Gordian knot of Roman theology and strategy. It is the root of every crisis and conflict. There is an urgent need not for a fresh historical study, but for a sociological analysis: this is the only way to bring a little light on to what has never appeared to be anything but a succession of discussions between different interests and debates about abstractions.

daily pursuits and occupations, his manners and relationships; he is caught up in a close net of customs and obligations, and knows what he must do and say every hour of the day. At least, he ought to know! There is little difference in his behaviour whether he is with students, women, children or working men: the only difference for him between the various types lies in their *occupation*. Looked at in this light, the Catholic industrial chaplain represents perhaps a new type of *pastor* unknown to previous generations; he certainly does not represent a new type of *priest* in spite of his specialized work; neither—if we take a step further—is he the factory chaplain or missionary[8]: all are known as 'ecclesiastics', received or rejected as agents of an ecclesiastical institution. The idea of the worker-priest creates some ambiguity. From the very name he would appear to be a hybrid creature endowed with a certain lack of balance. It is asked what he is or what he will want to be, because the difference between the worker-priest and the ordinary secular grows wider as time goes on. At first he seems to be a somewhat bold pastoral type of priest who is troubled by clericalism: 'why,' it is asked, 'does this cleric disguise himself as a layman except to take the place of a layman in laymen's business?' Then gradually he becomes aware that he is primarily engaged in looking for a new type of priest: in his daily life all the outward symbols associated with a priest disappear. Which vanishes, his *priestly* character or a *historic* and *temporary* form of the priesthood? This was the sense and drift of the debate which ended in their suppression by Rome.

This explains the difficulties felt when successors to them were set up, protected by being given a satisfactory formal status. There was a desire, to quote from Claudel's *Le Soulier de Satin*, to create a novelty which was really nothing new at all. Furthermore, the idea of a worker-priest not only possesses a strong attraction for the younger clergy, but also carries with it logical implications and consequences following upon laws from which there is no escape and which are beyond the power of any pope, however liberal, to modify.

(2) The worker-priests answered a profound call—a *missionary* call, it has been said, to use what has become a blessed word. Let us rid ourselves of the magic of the word. The Abbé Godin had just this intuition, that the word of God is conveyed to those who failed to grasp it at the beginning not through preaching by human words, but by human living: and then not by the example of a life which is in accord with the canons of hagiography, but by sharing in the kind of life the concrete conditions of which the Church knows nothing. Once that is assumed, the rest follows: the worker-priest is a worker, a trade-unionist, a fighter, and

[8]The difference between the dispenser of charity and the factory chaplain may be wide, as is to be seen from the various countries where they exist. France, which has also known Protestant worker-pastors, has escaped formulations of this kind.

should his mate's confidence demand it, a shop-steward. To share a particular kind of life involves a sharing of interests, struggles, and destiny.

By one and the same movement the worker-priests broke down two barriers, one which, owing to unforeseen associations, separates the Church and the proletariat, and the other which, owing to a secular tradition, separates clergy from laity.[9] Deprived of his social superiority, the priest ceased to belong to a body and play a definite part; he is no longer in a position of superiority. He is an equal, creating fraternal relationships with those over whom he has charge and, like them, completely *absque peccato*, as they said of their own accord, at the beginning of the Mission to Paris with a reference to the Epistle to the Hebrews.

It is then a mistake to speak here of clericalism: it is not a matter of some superficial adaptation but an internal assimilation, just as Fr. Lebbe wished to become a Chinaman with the Chinese. The worker-priest represents a new priestly type which he is trying to create rather than a new pastoral method, a transitional being if you like, anticipating the worker who is also a priest (not as he sees himself to-day, a priest who is also a worker), as well as the priest who is also a peasant. Is this a utopian ideal, or is it heresy? The latter, if we identify the priesthood with the clergy in the sense that the latter is a social and professional body. It will at any rate be noticed that this venture calls for a new sociology concerning the priesthood, but not necessarily for a new theology. This idea of a lay priesthood, if it may be so described, has nothing to do with the doctrine of the priesthood of believers and congregationalism; it is associated with a radical transformation of the conditions of the priest's life, not with any surrender of a priest's peculiar powers and responsibilities; it implies a renunciation of his social caste-marks, not of his sacramental character. Finally, it calls for new methods of social contact and encounter, concerning which enquiry must be made as to the form and urgency with which the Church needs them.

(3) When the problem is viewed in this light,[10] it is understandable why the Church hesitates; its present structure is completely bound up with a clerical hierarchy. But apart from the *institutional* problem, the

[9]Such had been the condition of the soldier-priest from temporary circumstances during the war.

[10]*Traductor, traditor?* I am analysing here past tendencies, for the worker-priests never evolved a theory concerning their position; rather they allowed themselves to be guided by events and what they revealed as circumstances changed and not by the fulfilment of any coherent plan. That was why they were divided by the decisions of Rome in March 1954. It is worth noting that since the Apostolic Constitution *Provida Mater Ecclesia* (1947), 'Secular Institutes' have grown in number for religious orders, consisting not of priests but of men and women who are living a completely lay life.

worker-priests present a strategic problem which calls in question what have usually been taken for granted as unquestionable certainties. They were commissioned on an evangelistic mission. Now they are told that they have very quickly become 'dumb dogs'. It must be pointed out that the problem exists on two planes. As a piece of apparatus within the organization and activity of the Roman Church (activities, movements, organizations, parties, etc.), the worker-priests are recognized as sharp-shooters, a reconnaissance-commando troop which has become a bridge-head. This quickly caused a sharply-felt tension on all sides. According to the teaching of papal encyclicals, the whole of this powerful apparatus has been patiently built up with the aim of making society Christian again and establishing a new Christendom; consequently for the unbeliever this means conversion to Catholicism, i.e. not just encounter with Christ of the Gospel and Word of God, but integration within the framework of the Church and the acceptance of its age-long outlook on the world. Furthermore, this conception, as it condemns socialism *altogether* and only the *abuses* within capitalism, ends in hallowing the present structure of society under the cloak of Christianity. Must then the proclamation of the Word of God be tied up with the notion that a Christian society must be more or less hierarchical in form, an ideal which has come down from the Middle Ages and is impregnated with nostalgia? This is a question which French Catholics have long debated and which has been answered by the worker-priests with a definite and radical negative. Thus, by explicitly rejecting the 'social thinking' of the Church and accepting the prospect of a socialized society, they not only weakened their position as sharp-shooters, but found themselves faced with difficult questions. What becomes of the Church's part in a world which means to dispense with its protection? What significance is left to the traditional Christian notions in a technological world which has shaken off its ancestral traditions? And what is to be said in the name of God to men who oppose a religious criticism of society with a sociological criticism of religion? This religion, purified of obsolete temporal elements, is in the process of searching for a new look to meet the times, and no one has any idea as to what form it should take. The unavoidable task of evangelism is set in a situation which has not been mapped out. It seems foolish to proclaim from outside a message of which the social element, such as brotherhood and peace, has already been assimilated by the best elements of the working-classes, while Christian circles more often than not have given a contrary witness. It seems foolish to wish to pour new wine into old bottles; it is first necessary to discover for oneself what in the forms of a nascent civilization might be of Christian significance and what are the concrete demands of the Gospel. The task is found to be not preaching, but being born afresh—all together, clergy and laity closely associated together as Christians in the same quest and in close contact with all those outside the Church who

yesterday were strangers, to-day are fellow-workmen living together, and to-morrow perhaps will be brothers in a faith expressed in their tongue.

After reading through this article, I feel profoundly dissatisfied at the almost cavalier fashion in which I have had to treat problems, each one of which demands a book to itself. The question of evangelism in particular calls for separate treatment. All the experiences of evangelism which have met the same obstacles—there is no shortage of them—should be collected and compared.[11] At any rate, I have wanted to point out that a powerful spiritual drive still animates the worker-priests, in spite of what outside observers may think. We may not agree with their choice of methods; we may criticize them, although I have not done so far the same reason that I have not given them unstinted praise. We may think that everything in their experiment has not equal value and that there are other paths to explore. All this is true. But two obvious conclusions cannot be avoided, (1) the reality, depth, and pressing nature of the problems raised by their very existence cannot be denied; (2) the Church does not seem to have seriously tackled these problems in any way at all. Hence, while it is admitted that in the end a status may be accorded to the worker-priests which allows them to make a fresh start, there is a danger that they may take refuge in one of the following alternatives. Either they will evade the problems which will continue to press upon them because they are afraid of losing their status, if they tackled them; or their ordered status will canalize the movement away from problems which are too searching, as has happened to many other movements in the past from that of St. Francis onwards.

[11]The writer of this article would be glad to hear from Anglicans, since in their country he considers that there have been over a long period a large number of very diverse experiments in evangelism which would provide an infinitely greater wealth of material than we know of in France.

# JESUS OR CHRIST?

By F. H. Cleobury

This article is written from the standpoint that the general trend of Christian theology since the First World War—from philosophy to history—has been in the wrong direction. The case for Christian philosophical theology, in the light of twentieth-century scientific developments and stated in the light of philosophical analysis, is stronger than ever, and there is an element of tragic irony in the fact that many theologians have chosen this moment to deprecate philosophy and to try to load upon history a burden of proof beyond its capacity. The writing of this article was prompted by my reading John Knox's *The Death of Christ*[1] and by its being fifty years since the publication of the famous Hibbert Journal Supplement *Jesus or Christ?* In my view traditional theologians have never answered adequately the question raised by Richard Roberts in that volume.

Quite early in Dr. Knox's book he raises a point which has for long seemed to me of the greatest importance in the study of Christian origins, but to which little attention has been given—that of the burden of proof. I mentioned the matter in an article in the *Modern Churchman* for December, which reads as follows:

> 'Generalizations about the discrediting of criticism often betray a fallacy—namely, that the traditionalist view on any point at issue must be accepted unless a critic can prove conclusively that it is false. But in a realm where we can but balance probabilities, the critic is only required to show that an alternative to the tradition has a higher probability. Neither traditionalist nor critic has the right to announce a thesis and then throw on others the burden of disproof.'

It was therefore with real interest that I found that Dr. Knox had devoted a section of his chapter *Problem and Approach* (pp. 37-42) to this question. He here criticizes the assumption of so many traditionalists that all the burden of proof lies on him who, in any detail, departs from the tradition. The gospels express the life and faith of the Churches in the final decades of the first century; they are primarily Church books. We cannot, therefore, decide such a question as, for example, our Lord's conception of his personal work by asking, 'What is to prevent our believing that Jesus is the creator of the conception of himself as the suffering Son of Man?' We ought to face the possibility that the question is, 'What requires us to attribute to Jesus a conception which could so naturally have arisen out of the experience and reflection of the primtive Christians?' Dr. Knox then criticizes C. H. Dodd and William Manson for their use,

[1]Collins, 1959.

in certain arguments, of such phrases as 'I can see no reasonable ground for rejecting . . . ', 'Are we compelled to reject . . . ?', 'Have we any right to say that such an expansion of ideas could have arisen only after the crucifixion?' In the instances in question, it is just as reasonable to ask whether we are compelled to *accept*, or whether the ideas could *not* have arisen after the crucifixion.

But I would go farther. The question, as I see it, is not only where the burden of proof lies, but whether any strict historical proof is possible. This point is of an importance impossible to exaggerate when we consider the contention of certain biblical and dogmatic theologians that there can be no philisophical basis for theology and that everything hangs on a historical revelation. If we were disposed to accept this contention, we should need to satisfy ourselves that any detail which the biblical theologian claimed to be revealed in history was *certain*. A living faith, a sure and certain hope, must have something more to support it than the opinion that on the whole Professor A has a stronger case than Professor B. The appeal to history has been vitiated by failure to see clearly what is required. Let us suppose that there is some detail which traditionalists wish to maintain as historical. In such a case there may well be three or four alternative constructions, including the traditional one, which can be claimed as possible interpretations of the documentary data. What all too frequently happens is that the non-traditionalist critic devotes most of his space to supporting one of the alternatives. The defender of the tradition then devotes *his* space to pointing out the difficulties in the critic's construction, and the reader is then left to conclude that since the critic's alternative is not completely certain, the tradition stands. What the critic should have done is to discuss whether *any* of the possible alternatives, including the traditional one, is so free from difficulties, so overwhelmingly more probable than the others, that belief in any of the others must be due to bias. If he came to the conclusion that none of the alternatives yielded this measure of certainty, the traditionalist would be forced either to concede the point or to claim *certainty* for the traditional interpretation. But those who felt that the critic had made his point would infer one basic certainty from the demonstrated uncertainty—namely, that on the point at issue God had not intended us to be certain as a matter of history; it cannot be an element in a historically-based Kerygma.

With these general considerations in mind, Dr. Knox's book can be read with profit. He shows that there are quite reasonable grounds for doubting whether Jesus regarded himself as King-Messiah, Son of man, or Suffering Servant. This is an instance of the general question which I have been discussing. For the effect of reading his treatment of the subject has not been to convince me completely. On balance I incline to the opinion that Jesus did regard himself as in some sense called upon to fulfil both the Son of man and Suffering Servant prophecies. But what

seems to me so significant is that absolute certainty on the point is unobtainable. Dr. Knox may be right. The point, therefore, is not an element in the historical Kerygma.

Although the book is explicitly a study of the meaning of the *death* of Christ, its argument has very direct bearings on the question of his Divinity. He writes (p. 71): 'If by being "more than a man" we mean that he lacked the normal self-consciousness of a man, then we are saying that he was less than a man. . . . It may be possible to think of him as being "more than a man" in ways which permit us to think of him also as being a man, but we cannot think of him as *knowing* he was more than man without denying that he was man at all—that is, a true, sane man.' This reminds me of a passage in Dr. Leonard Hodgson's *Doctrine of the Atonement.*[2]

Actually, this question of the content of the self-consciousness of Jesus is an outstanding example of that uncertainty which confronts us so often in the study of Christian origins—an uncertainty which makes it clear that no view of the self-consciousness of Jesus is an essential element in the Christian Kerygma. It is possible to argue (1) that the Fourth Gospel is correct in attributing to Jesus a knowledge of his pre-existence as Divine Logos ('Before Abraham was, I am'); (2) that, on the contrary, he thought of himself as on the human side of the gulf which, in the eyes of orthodox Jews, separated God from men, but that he believed himself to be called by God to be Son of man and Suffering Servant; (3) that, as Dr. Knox holds, his consciousness was entirely human and did not even include a belief that he had been called to fulfil either of these functions. The only certainty there appears to be is that neither (2) nor (3) is an impossible view, and that (1) will never be demonstrated so completely that it can become an essential part of the Christian gospel.

If the Fourth Gospel account is to be taken as history, it is difficult to see why the synoptic-Acts view should have arisen. If the synoptic view is historical, it is not nearly so difficult to see how the 'Johannine' version arose. Although the early Jewish disciples, after the crucifixion, regarded Jesus as human, they attributed to him a status and functions which a Greek, with his tendency to humanize his gods and deify great men, would regard as divine. The bridge from the early Jewish conception to the conception which culminated in Athanasius was built by Paul. But this bridge was not metaphysics; it was metaphor and myth. Not that the myth must be written off as merely false; indeed, the passage from a simply human view of Jesus to the *essential* Christian incarnation doctrine was the most important event in the history of man's religious thought, and its validity can be maintained to-day.

[2]P. 138.
'It is not necessary to faith in the godhead of Christ to maintain that during his earthly ministry he was consciously aware of that godhead.'

The essential incarnation-doctrine—the great contribution of the line of revelation recorded in the Bible—is that there is a point of identity between man and God. God is *not wholly* Other. God is revealed by man at man's highest, but the image is marred and distorted by sin. It was because of the *ethical* supremacy of Jesus, not because of any metaphysical distinction between him and us, that in reflecting on his life and death and his power, after death, to create the resurrection-faith, men came to believe in the humanity-in-God, the eternal Son, and the divinity in man. Mankind came to self-consciousness and valid God-consciousness because Jesus had lived.

But the vital, the essential, thing is to believe in the eternal Son, in the humanity-in-God, in virtue of which he shares our suffering. In principle it must not be deemed impossible that by philosophical thought men might have arrived at the conception of the Eternal Son. Indeed, it is latent in the early Hebrew conception of man as made in God's image. And a modern philosopher who holds that the awareness of the Absolute must transcend our time-awareness may well hold that the truest appearance of the Absolute to men who view Reality under the time-form will be of an infinitude which expresses itself as ominpotence—as a potency which achieves ends *gradually*, can be opposed, thwarted and must therefore suffer. From the standpoint of such a philosophy, the historical Jesus is not essential. God is revealed by any men, whether consciously followers of Jesus or not, who live in the spirit which animated Jesus. It is very seriously to be considered whether, in the encounter between Christianity and other faiths in the modern world, we are being true to our faith when we emphasize the centrality of the historical Jesus. We need never fear that his supremacy will be challengeable; it is a simple fact, which nothing can alter, that in him man came to full self-consciousness as divinely indwelt, and to valid God-consiousness. But we are false to him if we claim that no man cometh unto the Father but by him.

Dr. Knox's discussion of the meaning of the death of Jesus is in many respects admirable. He considers three main types of interpretation—victory, sacrifice and revelation. The two first belonged to the mythology of the early Christian centuries. The death registered a victory over malignant powers which held mankind in thrall. Or it was a sacrifice (either in the sense of a cult sacrifice or in the sense of paying a ransom or debt or penalty). Dr. Knox sees clearly that the modern mind finds difficulty in these 'explanations', which claim to record objective transactions. But although they must be rejected as rational explanations, they are illuminating and true as 'dramatic ways of expressing the whole event of Christ'. I must confess that I find this difficult to follow, and I am fairly sure that the man-in-the-pew will share my bewilderment. This sort of language, which seems to express a wish to have it both ways, is all too characteristic of modern theology. He tells us that the images of victory and sacrifice

express 'empirical meanings'—they are true and irreplaceable 'as conveying something of the concrete meaning of the deliverance, its quality and its transforming power, and because that quality and that power can be conveyed in no other way'.

So far as I can see, all that is vital and true here can be stated much more clearly and simply. The third view, the 'revelation' view, is that the cross, interpreted in the light of the incarnation-doctrine, reveals the love of God and thus moves men to genuine repentance. This is a psychological, not a mythical, explanation, and it does not have to explain away, as do the other two types of view, the fact that the Hebrew prophets and Jesus himself taught that God could and would forgive the sinner if he repented genuinely. What is needed for atonement is not a transaction, which made salvation possible, but a revelation which makes repentance genuine. Now all that Dr. Knox seems to be saying is that a modern man who is thus moved to repentance by a revelation of the love of God experiences a sense of release, of power, of victory. To say that the modern man *needs* the myths that the first century man needed is surely not true.

To maintain his point, Dr. Knox argues that the third view, the 'revelation' or moral influence view, is open to objection. He can thus maintain that *none* of the three types of view is an explanation; he seems to be trying to soften the blow caused by his rejection of the two traditional interpretations by also rejecting the one accepted by liberals. He says (p. 153) that the death of Jesus could not reveal the love of God unless something objective, for our benefit, was being accomplished by it. 'The death must benefit us if it is to reveal love for us.' If, therefore, we say that it benefits us because it reveals love, we are arguing in a circle. I find this quite unconvincing. The death reveals the love of God to those who see the human life of love and service and sacrifice as a point of identity with God. This revelation 'benefits' us in the sense that it induces repentance. There is no circular reasoning here. A revelation can be, in a very real sense, an objective transaction—in the field of human psychology.

In spite, however, of these points, on which the older liberals will feel some measure of dissent, it must be said that Dr. Knox has written an important work which they will welcome. Fifty years ago liberals were raising the question, 'Jesus or Christ?' They urged that Christianity is essentially a religion philosophically based on the concept of the Eternal Christ, and that, therefore, the life and death of Jesus, although the historical occasion of the Faith, is not metaphysically essential to it; in that sense we need no longer 'know Christ after the flesh'. They were also demanding that the death of Jesus should be interpreted not mythologically, but psychologically. Dr. Knox's book is an indication that these issues are still alive, and that the liberal answers cannot be dismissed as outmoded.

# ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION

*An opinion submitted to the Home Office Departmental Committee at their request on behalf of the Modern Churchmen's Union*

LIBERALISM in religion is distinguished by an attitude of reserve towards authority in spiritual matters and an insistence that theological issues should be submitted to the judgment of reason. On the face of it, therefore, a question such as artificial insemination involves, which some would say belongs to the specialized field of medical ethics, would not seem to be one in which the distinctive insights of liberalism were relevant. The principles of charity, justice and social interest that liberals would apply, together with the scale of values to which they are related, are held in common with all Christian people.

But the reserve towards authority in spiritual matters extends also to ethical authoritarianism. Reason is not committing trespass if it moves beyond the confines of dogmatics. Thus liberals would deny the validity of ethical rules intended to be observed at all times and in all circumstances however imposing the authority that legislated them. They would tend to be more radical than other Christians in their treatment of venerated traditions.

Actions, they would say, are not right or wrong intrinsically. In this they differ fundamentally both from the Roman Church and certain schools of philosophy which hold that there are actions which are right or wrong in themselves. By a process of explication the Roman Church has constructed an impressive body of rules designed to cover every foreseeable contingency. Against this, liberals say that moral judgment can only be pronounced upon an action in relation to the whole situation within which it occurs, in so far as this can be known and understood. The relevant situation includes the motives, purpose and the foreseen consequences outside the main intention.

As an example, consider the act of killing a human being. What has to be judged is the taking of a life. Until there has been thorough investigation of the circumstances, it cannot be morally judged as one of murder, legal execution, act of war, accident, manslaughter or euthanasia. Confusion often arises because such a word as 'murder' is taken to denote an act; whereas actually it denotes a moral judgment passed upon an act.

Applying this principle to artificial insemination, it seems clear to the Modern Churchmen's Union that no universally valid rule can be laid down one way or the other. Even many of those who are hostile to some forms of the practice recognize that, in the circumstance of the husband being the donor of the semen, it may be a perfectly legitimate correction, by means of scientific medicine, of an unfortunate physical disability. In view of the happiness and relief that the method may bring to a married couple desirous of children, and unable, in the normal course of events,

to have them, it is welcomed. An obstacle is removed to the fulfilment of one of the divinely ordained purposes of marriage. The Modern Churchmen's Union would agree entirely with this.

Enquiry must therefore centre principally upon A.I.D., in which the donor is not married to the woman. Let us first examine the objections that are raised.

It is held that the circumstance of the potential mother being either a spinster or married to a man other than the donor makes artificial insemination tantamount either to fornication or adultery, and therefore to be condemned.

We cannot follow this argument. Artificial insemination is basically so new that it cannot easily be fitted into the traditional categories of sexual sin. A new category has to be created, and whether or not it has to come under condemnation is an open question. Before we can know whether or not the condemnation incurred by fornication and adultery applies also to artificial insemination, we must first ask why it is they are condemned. We cannot agree that the appeal to the authority either of the Bible or of the Church finally disposes of the question.

Following the example already quoted, we must point out that 'fornication' and 'adultery' are not words denoting acts committed but denote moral judgments pronounced upon acts. The act is copulation. 'Fornication' and 'adultery' define certain circumstances in which it may have been committed. But when A.I.H. is used, resort is always had to artificial insemination precisely because no act of copulation is even possible. The process can therefore hardly become copulation merely because a man other than the husband is involved. The process is not artificial copulation but artificial insemination, which is quite different.

The evils of fornicatian and adultery are two. In the first place, they imply disloyalty either to the principle of marriage or to an existing spouse, or both. In the second place, they are believed to exert a disintegrating influence on society.

As to the first, the whole intention of A.I.D. is to avoid disloyalty. If this is so, then it cannot incur the condemnation reserved for fornication and adultery. Subjectively considered, the set of feelings, passions, desires and intentions accompanying A.I.D. are so fundamentally different and opposite from those accompanying fornication and adultery that it makes nonsense of words to suggest that the processes are the same. For instance, many women who would readily contemplate A.I.D. as a possibility would find the idea of taking a lover for the same purpose utterly repugnant. The one, being impersonal, is irrelevant either to her relationship with her husband or to her own feelings and conscience. The other, because it is personal, is destructive.

As to the social evils that arise out of fornication and adultery, we have not a shred of evidence that similar evils follow the use of A.I.D. Indeed,

this absence of evidence is profoundly frustrating to thought about the subject. Everybody is working in the dark. It may be that the confidential nature of the practice makes the collection of evidence difficult. Yet we would strongly recommend that systematic research should be undertaken into the consequences of A.I.D., and that the results of this research should be made available to the public. As it is, the Modern Churchmen's Union is inclined to be sceptical of the more dramatic speculations.

It is often the same critics who object to A.I.D. on the ground that it means adultery or fornication who also object on the ground that it involves the act of masturbation. These objections, surely, are mutually exclusive. If to obtain semen for the purpose of artificial insemination constitutes masturbation, which is essentially a solitary vice, it cannot also be fornication or adultery. In any case, once again, the purposes are so totally different as to differentiate the moral judgments on the acts themselves. Masturbation is the obtaining of semen for the sake of self-indulgence. In artificial insemination the purpose, ostensibly, at any rate, is the charitable one of enabling a frustrated woman to satisfy a good and natural desire. What element of cupidity or self-gratification may enter in some instances does not affect the judgment upon the others.

Artificial insemination is opposed in some quarters on the ground of Natural Law. It is said to be an unnatural practice. This conclusion, however, begs the whole question. The purpose of the investigation is precisely to discover whether or not the practice is in harmony with the purposes of nature. The idea of Natural Law as usually stated is too vague and formal to provide guidance in matters of this kind. Life in human society has become more and more artificial as the centuries have gone by, and ethics must necessarily take this fact into account in order to be realistic. If Natural Law offers any principle at all in the case before us, surely the respect for personality and the liberty of the individual it requires imply freedom for private judgment in such intimate matters as these. They are outside the province of State interference.

Similarly unrealistic is the claim that the natural repugnances of decent people provide a safe guide and should find embodiment in law. Some people feel a very strong repugnance either to the whole idea of artificial insemination or to various aspects of it. The argument is that this repugnance arises from the kind of intuition that is said to be at the basis of all moral judgments.

To this the apt rejoinder has been made that in the past spontaneous reactions such as these have provided justification for barbarities that are now universally deprecated. In fact this is the weakest argument of all. If intuition plays a part in ethical thinking it is in discerning the ultimate values rather than in deciding whether particular acts offend against them. It is here that reason plays its part. Repugnance has often dissolved in approbation when actual experience has come under scientific

scrutiny. A closely related example is that of family planning, now formally approved in quarters where, not many decades ago, it was regarded with feelings akin to horror.

Emotional repugnance may be useful among decent folk in turning them away almost automatically from what strikes them as morally ugly. It is more usually the consequence of thought and teaching than the origin of them. But often it is nothing more than the prejudice arising out of psychological maladjustment. As a principle of legislation, it is wholly unreliable. It is always the repugnances of 'decent' people that are prayed in aid. But what is the criterion of decency? Generally speaking, we regard as 'decent' those who share our emotional repugnances. Here the argument goes into a circle. Who and where are these decent people? In our own group of acquaintances, for instance, we have found a tendency among the men to feel repugnance against the impersonal, mechanical character of artificial insemination. On the other hand, it is precisely this impersonal quality that commends it to many of the women. Are the men, then, 'decent' and the women not, or *vice versa*? In the end we feel that the argument from emotional repugnance will only result in throwing us back on the prejudices of the majority, whereas what we are being asked to do is to guide the minds of the majority.

We have to recognize that we have no guidance from the past in considering this problem. It is new, and we have to make up our minds about it in the light of what it is likely to mean from the standpoint of the highest interests of society and the individual. We have to acknowledge, also, that most of us look at the practice as people who have brought children into the world by the normal means and are therefore likely to feel irrationally repelled by the processes involved in the alternative means. Those who resort to it evidently do not experience this emotional repugnance, and if we are asked to legislate for them or offer guidance, we also must put it aside.

Yet we cannot ignore the fact that, generally speaking, people do regard strangely any abnormality in the origin of a child. Consciousness of this is reflected in the insistence, in nearly all discussions of the subject, upon secrecy. Every attempt is to be made to confine the knowledge to the smallest number of people. The general opinion seems to be that the parents and the doctor alone should know. The child might suffer harmful psychological consequences if it discovered the truth and the contempt or the derision of its associates if they knew. There are people who might pursue it throughout life with the unfortunate phrase, 'test-tube baby'.

Then, the child's life begins and continues in deception. He is represented to himself and to others as the son of a man who is not his father in the physical sense. To some people this seems an unsatisfactory foundation for so sacred a thing as a human life. May it not colour the attitude of the parents?

There is also involved a fundamental act of irresponsibility. A man is partly responsible for the life he has helped to bring into the world. All the circumstances of artificial insemination compel repudiation of that responsibility. While some men would rejoice in giving their powers to some unfortunate woman and would think in terms of the new happiness they were making possible, others would recoil from the suggestion, feeling that responsibility is inalienable.

Again, it is never possible to foresee what the adoptive father's reactions will be as the child grows up. One who has readily agreed in the first instance may change as the years pass. The presence of a growing child by an unknown man may seem to him an incessant reminder of his own lack of virility. In the case of a spinster, of course, this does not apply.

Looking to the more distant future, some envisage artificial insemination as another step in the depersonalization of human relationships that contemporary civilization is bringing about. These dread the perceptible drift toward an Orwellian 1984.

All these objections are highly practical and deserve the most serious consideration. Yet to each one the rejoinder can be made, 'on the other hand'. To the last, for instance, it could be replied that the vast majority of mankind will always prefer the usual means of procreation and that never more than a tiny minority will resort to the artificial. Far from encouraging an Orwellian 1984 or a Huxley brave new world, the actual result of artificial insemination will be to humanize and enrich a number of lives that would otherwise be sterile and unfulfilled.

Some of the objections would be just as relevant to adoption, which is approved as excellent by all moral authorities. They would apply when a man takes to wife an unmarried mother and agrees to treat the child as his own son, which some men have done with admirable results. They also apply when a husband forgives his wife's adultery and accepts the child as his own.

Some, if not all, of the objections would vanish if the true character of the triangular relationship of mother, father and child were better understood. The physical participation of the father in the process of conception and development is a comparatively small element in this relationship. It is completed before development begins at all. Physically the mother is far more important both during the embryonic stage and the first years of independent life. Even between married couples the rôle of the father in conception is often far from satisfactorily fulfilled. It is with the passage of the months and years, as the child develops through infancy to maturity, that the rôle of the father assumes its true proportions. Ideally, this development should be the spontaneous blossoming of the love relationship between husband and wife. Where this ideal is actualized, as it very frequently is, the means of insemination are a wholly

irrelevant, technical consideration. We think of an actual case in which the husband had been rendered sterile by illness but who, with his wife, longed for a child as the expression of their mutual love. They employed A.I.D. with altogether good results.

When all these *pros* and *cons* are put into the scales, it is not easy to see on which side the balance weighs. Much more research is necessary as a basis for sound generalization. Far too much of the thinking on this problem starts with a particular case that happens to have come to the attention regardless of all the others, or from speculation as to what might happen regardless of what has actually happened. This kind of thinking is unscientific and, as we know from experience in other fields, can be seriously misleading. It is to be hoped that means will be found of collecting material in a scientific way without violating the confidence of individuals. We shall then at least have at our disposal the essential statistics.

But the hostile evidence would have to be overwhelming to justify legislation and State action with all the accompanying apparatus of prosecutions, sanctions and penalties. We would object with all our might to legislation that turned the fulfilment of a woman's natural desire for a child into a crime. It should not be a crime for her to submit to artificial insemination. Neither should it be a crime for a medical man to administer. To penalize a doctor for assisting in the creation of life would be a strange reversal of the Hippocratic oath.

If resort to A.I.D. is to be regarded as sinful, then we would support the Archbishop of Canterbury in distinguishing between those private sins which ought not to be the subjects of legislation at all and those that should be made into crimes and attract penalties because they are damaging to the interests of society. The undesirable result of legislating against A.I.D. would be to drive it underground and call into existence a furtive and sordid but lucrative trade battening on private sorrow, as in the case of abortion. The likelihood of this consequence would not in itself be a conclusive argument. It is not conclusive against the prohibition of abortion. There are practices of which society ought to manifest disapproval even when the prohibition is difficult to enforce .

A.I.D. is not one of them. If it is a sin, it resembles adultery in being one of those sins against which legislation is inappropriate. It is a matter between the consciences of the individuals concerned and God. As such it is more the concern of the Church than of the State. The Church can exert influence by teaching and personal dealing in matters of this kind much better than the State can by the operation of Statute Law and the Courts. In the division of responsibilities between Church and State, this is one that naturally and properly falls to the Church.

Yet we would hesitate to go so far as agree with a general denunciation of A.I.D. as sin. At the worst we would say it is ill-advised. Our final

conclusion is that A.I.D. should be used only as a last resort. Only when it is used irresponsibly can it be stigmatized as sin. In any particular case the morality of it is a question that only the individuals concerned can decide. This they should do after hearing the best advice available from fully-qualified advisers, both spiritual and medical. A very heavy responsibility rests upon the doctor administering the treatment of ensuring that they have done this and are fully aware of what is involved.

## THE CHRISTIAN APPROACH TO NON-CHRISTIAN FAITHS

The editors and publishers of the Library of Constructive Theology are to be congratulated on adding to an important series of theological works a volume[1] dealing with the relation of Christianity to non-Christian faiths. It has become increasingly evident that the exclusive claim of Christianity to be the unique revelation of God to mankind poses acute problems for Christian theologians, not only in view of our deepening understanding of other great world faiths, and their renewed vitality and counter-claims, but also because vast numbers of thinking people, brought up in the Western world in a so-called Christian civilization, have in large measure repudiated the interpretations of man's nature, status and destiny offered by orthodox Christians.

Dr. A. C. Bouquet brings to the writing of this book the rich and varied experience of many years. Through long and intimate study of non-Christian religions and friendly intercourse with several of their noblest adherents he has learned to be appreciative of what is best in them, but his conviction that Christianity, re-interpreted and re-vitalized, is *the faith for mankind* remains unshaken. By developing the Logos doctrine, as expounded by Justin Martyr and second century Christian apologists, he is able to affirm that God's revelation of Himself has not been denied to non-Christian religions, and believes that fundamental to the Christian's approach to non-Christians is the attitude of C. F. Andrews when he said, 'I always take it for granted that they *are* Christians, and as I talk to them, I often see the light of Christ come into their eyes' (p. 160). But the supreme manifestation of the Logos is to be found only in the historical Jesus, and all the religious aspirations of mankind can find their complete satisfaction in Him alone.

The plan of the book is set forth on page 18 of the introduction. After seeking to establish the reasonableness of the Christian doctrine of God in face of the modern views of the universe and the arguments of Logical Positivists, and of the Christian doctrine of man as opposed to the teaching of Hinduism and Buddhism, the author makes a rapid historical survey of religion, giving the phenomenon of Islam a chapter to itself. After discussing the expansion of Christianity and the development of the Logos doctrine, the author takes up the problems raised when Christianity, as a missionary religion, faces the present world-situation. In spite of many resemblances between Christianity and other faiths, the author points to fundamental differences which must be faced. Far more must be done to encourage the indigenization of Christianity among the peoples of Asia and Africa. The challenge of Marxism must be squarely faced, and also the resurgent vitality of Hinduism, Buddhism and Islam, the move towards the emancipation of backward peoples, the rise of acute nationalism, and the humanist repudiation of Christianity in the light of modern knowledge and the world situation. The author affirms his own faith that, if Christians are able to solve the problems of effectively communicating the basic Christian truths to the world, Christianity will prove the only really satisfying religion for mankind. What the world needs is 'not a new religion, but a newly expressed and renewed Christianity'.

It is just here that the crucial problem emerges, and one feels that the author's attempt to deal with it is not altogether satisfactory. What is that newly expressed and renewed Christianity which will prove an adequate faith for the modern world? In

[1] *The Christian Faith and Non-Christian Religions*, by A. C. Bouquet. (Nisbet, London. 1958. Pp. 430, 25/-.)

answering that question Christianity itself is hopelessly divided. The Roman Catholic would argue that the only adequate faith is that accepted by the visible, orthodox and historic Church which has continued in unbroken succession from Christ and His apostles, as defined by the creeds and dogmas of Roman Catholicim. The Protestant fundamentalist would claim that it is a faith rooted in an infallible Bible, and in a unique revelation of God made at one definite point in history in the atoning death and resurrection of the God-man, Jesus Christ. All other religions are but the product of sinful man's strivings or at best the feeble flowering of partial truths. Kraemer would rank empirical Christianity along with all other world religions as under the judgement of God. The revelation of God in the Bible, and culminating in Jesus Christ, is sui generis, 'wholly other', 'different in kind', from all the religions of the world. However kindly and tolerant we may be to people of other faiths, man everywhere is lost, and religion only emphasizes his lostness. Salvation is only possible for man anywhere through the appropriation of God's unique word and deed in Christ. At the other extreme W. E. Hocking believes that Christianity is only on its way to becoming universal, and is in need of reconception, particularly through a deeper and humbler intercourse with the soul of the East. It is not something which we have, and can therefore transmit: it is something we have continually to seek. He sees 'that the whole trend of global life is in the direction of a single world-religion' (p. 365) but that world-religion would certainly not be identical with orthodox Christianity.

Dr. Bouquet sees Christianity 'as a way of life which derives from and is centred upon the historical Jesus, and the Gospel is one which is about him as well as something proclaimed by Him' (p. 121). He would admit 'any system which places the historical Jesus in a central position' as within the fold of Christianity. His tests of orthodoxy are certainly a valiant and eirenical attempt to embrace within orthodoxy communions which have very disparate beliefs concernng the Christian faith, and one is left wondering what 'the broad highway of teaching is borne witness to by the canonical scriptures' might include or leave out; and what would be considered 'fair deduction from the action and teaching of the historical Jesus'; and how far there is or ever was a 'generous concensus of belief on such matters' (p. 121). In comparing Christianity with other faiths it is possible to overstress the significance of the historical foundations. What is historically trustworthy and indisputable in the origins of Christianity is slender, and the mythologizing process, evident in all religions, began very early on in Christianity. *Fact* is inextricably bound up with *interpretation* even within the Gospels themselves. Hence the question arises as to how far what Dr. Bouquet calls 'a general concensus of belief' will need radical revaluation if Christianity is to meet the challenge of the modern world-situation.

The comparisons which the author makes between Christianity and other faiths, though always made in a courteous and appreciative spirit, are not always quite fair. One can affirm (p. 193) 'that Bhakti Hinduism contains no suggestion of a call by a Holy God to action of an ethical nature', if by a Holy God you mean the Christian concept of God, and by 'ethical action' the Christian standard of ethics. The *Gita,* which contains the essence of Bhakti Hinduism, has been interpreted by many Hindus themselves as centring in this very idea of a Holy God calling His devotee to ethical action; not renunciation of action, but action performed as sacrifice and love without desire for the fruits of action. Dr. Bouquet writes (p. 197), 'The doctrine of karma as cosmic justice is in itself abhorent . . . it cannot be regarded as truly righteous, since it is vindictive and merciless'. What would he reply to an Indian who said that the doctrine of the atonement, as held by most Christians for centuries and expounded by great Christian theologians, was likewise abhorent, and a travesty of

God's justice and love? What about the millions of Christians who have lived and died within a rigid Calvinism, which proclaimed that the saved and the damned were predetermined by the sovereign will of God? Dr. Bouquet might quite rightly claim that a change has taken place in the generally accepted interpretation of many fundamental Christian doctrines; but the same may surely be true in Hinduism and Buddhism. The expression of a religion in the lives of its devotees is often far lovelier than its creeds. 'The world-transforming constructiveness of the Chritian movement', which Dr. Bouquet evidences for the superiority of Christianity, is often regarded by non-Christian peoples, with some justification, as world-encompassing cultural aggressiveness. The insistence on the superiority of Chritianity in its social and remedial work can be overstressed. It is unfair to make a comparison between the work of modern missions in hospitals, schools, etc., backed as they have been by the enormous financial and material resources of highly industrialized countries, with the efforts along similar lines made by non-Christian religions. Perhaps a fairer comparison would be between Christian social services in mediaeval Europe and the social and educational service rendered by Buddhism in Japan. It is undoubtedly true that Christianity has developed far greater organization and cohesiveness than most other religions so that the charity and good-will of the individual have been more easily canalized into co-operative effort. But it would be a mistake to under-estimate the civilizing and remedial work performed in eastern lands through monastic foundations and lay societies. Often, both in Christianity and in other religions, the communal conscience has been strangely apathetic, and it has been left to the individual to see some crying need and remedy it.

Several times in the book the author hints that many of the best elements in Hinduism and Buddhism are possibly derived from Christian influences. No one will deny the powerful influence of the modern missionary movement in the revitalization of eastern religions, but we are on unsafe ground when we attribute the noblest characteristics of Mahayana Buddhism or Bhakti Hinduism to Christian influence. All the great world religions, including Christianity, have been at times stimulated by external influences, sometimes even giving rise to syncretistic movements. All religions, including Christianity, have passed through periods of amazing fertility, adaptability and vitality, and have also had periods when they were comparatively stagnant and moribund.

Although in the chapter on Indigenization the author has many pertinent observations to make, he seems to conceive of the Younger Churches as, of necessity, under the paternal control of the missionaries. He details many particulars in which the process of indigenization might be carried forward, but the fundamental question is, By whom? True indigenization involves the containing of the treasure of the Gospel within earthly vessels which have been moulded out of the indigenous civilization. It involves the clothing of the Spirit of Christ by a body (the Church) which is in no wise foreign. It means that in all matters the power of final decision must be left to the native church. The Christian missionary may guide, persuade, point out what is regulative in the parent church, what is generally accepted within the Church universal, but he should not override, nor have the power to override, even what he feels to be wrong and unchristian decisions. The recognition of a man as a Christian involves a willingness to accept him as a responsible moral agent before God. It is an adventure in trust. To prohibit the passing round of a tobacco cheroot (p. 219) does not only wound people's sense of good manners; it strikes a blow against true indigenization.

The range and scope of the book are so wide that it would be a miracle if there were not a few points needing correction. The Buddhist movement entered China

long before the *sixth century A.D.* (p.88). The worship of the supreme God took place on the white marble *altar* (not temple) of Heaven in Peking (p. 182). The mother of the founder of the Chou dynasty was said to have stepped in a footprint made by *Shang Ti,* not *T'ien* (p. 200). The *Hymns of Universal Praise* were not used by the Roman Catholics (p. 217). But these are small points which do not in anywise mar the usefulness of the book, which should prove stimulating and thought-provoking, and a notable contribution to one of the most challenging subjects facing the Christian Church in our time. It is a great pity that a book covering so large and varied a field should be without an index.

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## LUKE THE THEOLOGIAN*

This third volume of Black's New Testament Commentaries claims to be 'an assessment of the character and value of St. Luke as theologian no less than historian, encouraging the study of his gospel as a great religious document and a primary source of Christian doctrine'. Much in the book supports this claim. The first quarter consists of a series of notes dealing with particular subjects and passages. A further quarter is taken up with a translation of the text, and the rest is commentary.

While the notes contain a good deal of interesting material, one cannot help but feel that many of them suffer from special pleading, and that, both in their choice, and in their content, they are designed as a groundwork for the commentary which follows, itself somewhat eclectic, and lacking the detailed impartial scholarly exegesis needed in a commentary claiming the attention of university students. In view of the present popularity of typology, the book will be an excellent quarry for sermons.

In the first of the notes, that on the infancy narratives, the author finds himself confronted with the problem of their inconsistency. Following well known precedents, he divides them into two primary sources from which Luke, rather clumsily, produced the finished story. Chapter II, excepting verse 21, with the Magnificat and the Benedictus added from chapter I, formed an account of the birth of Jesus by natural processes; chapter I, less the parts already deleted, plus chapter II, 21, was originally an account of the birth of John, and of the annunciation to Mary. Here, in relation to this second source, Mr. Leaney comes up against the Scylla of Joseph's parentage, II : 27, and the Charybdis of Mary's virginity, I : 34. His solution would appear to be that the reader can accept the latter if he cuts out all reference to the former, or vice versa, a glimpse at the obvious without the *tour de force* of his argument.

If the desire is to exculpate Luke from the charge of inconsistency—obviously someone blundered—then a simpler solution would be to take chapter III as the original beginning of the gospel to which were later prefaced the infancy narratives by another hand. This would make the beginning of Luke's gospel consistent with the Markan pattern which, in general, he follows. It would also explain why Luke did not, with Matthew, change Mark's 'Thou art my beloved son', to 'This is my beloved son', thus making the baptismal annunciation one addressed to John and the crowds, and not to Jesus alone. If we adopt the reading of the Western text of Luke III, 22, 'this day have I begotten thee', which Mr. Leaney prefers, then the argument that this was the beginning of the gospel is the more forceful. Luke, with Mark, saw in the baptism of Jesus, not in his birth, the secret of his divine sonship.

That chapters I and II are really alien to the rest of Luke's gospel might be further

**The Gospel according to St. Luke,* by A. R. C. Leaney. (A. & C. Black, 25/-.)

supported by the presence in them of characteristics which are not his, and which bear signs of a later date. The narrative taken as a whole, for it is all-one-of-a-piece, is longer by far than any other sections of the gospel, not excluding the passion narrative; the doctrine is more developed and explicit than in the rest of the gospel; canticles suggest liturgical use, and the presence of so much of the hyper-miraculous savours more of the Apocryphal Gospels than of the Synoptics. The so-called Lukan style and linguistic traits—and they are more problematical both here and elsewhere than Mr. Leaney appears to think, are no guarantee of Lukan authorship.

Whether the infancy narratives were prefaced to the gospel by Luke, or by some other hand, it is not possible to erase the Virgin Birth except from these chapters as a whole. Their literary structure demands it. After the miraculous birth of John of parents past the age of child bearing, the birth of Jesus by natural processes would be an unpardonable and unthinkable anticlimax, and would destroy one of the finest examples of early Christian story telling. There are other inseparable parallel passages which bind the story together; angelic announcements; their recipients' doubts; promises of the gift of the Holy Spirit; and the naming of the children. One can create a patchwork from any garment, but only by sacrificing its form and beauty. There is such a thing as misplaced ingenuity. Mr. Leaney writes, 'not the least typically Semitic trait is a formal inconsistency which amounts almost to illogicality' (p. 20): one wonders why he tries so hard to remove it.

Further notes of interest are those on the rejection at Nazareth; the Lukan text of the Lord's Prayer; the days of the Son of Man; and the institution of the Eucharist. In these, as in other notes, Mr. Leaney indulges in literary and psychological analysis almost to the extent of making one feel that he is really rewriting Luke's gospel for him. Despite this, much of which is sagacious and entertaining, many obvious and important problems are left in the reader's mind. Why for instance, in the Nazareth incident, is the public claim to, and declaration of Messiahship by Jesus, for such it was, put at the beginning of the ministry when it is elsewhere veiled in secrecy even in Luke's special material until Caesarea Philippi and the entry into Jerusalem? Presumably another of Luke's inconsistencies. By far the longest note is that on the text of the Lord's Prayer. Here Mr. Leaney marshals all the material available in favour of the inclusion of the phrase 'may thy Holy Spirit come upon us and cleanse us', but despite the evidence given, despite its masterly presentation, one may be excused from wondering why it survived in so very few, and so very late authorities. 'One of the days of the Son of Man' receives somewhat arbitrary treatment. 'The days' are identified with 'a number of glorious days . . . the Transfiguration, the Resurrection and the Ascension taken together, the appearances to Stephen and Paul, the restoration of Jerusalem and Israel, and the final consummation'. Here again the reader may be excused for asking, why, if the Transfiguration, Resurrection, and Ascension were referred to by Jesus as 'days of the Son of Man', he should have told the disciples that they would not see one of them, when at least some of them were present on these occasions? Difficult as the interpretation of this passage may be, it seems unnecessary to go out of one's way to ignore its obvious eschatological setting: but Mr. Leaney does not like honest-to-goodness Jewish eschatology, not for Luke at any rate. In his note on the institution of the Eucharist, Mr. Leaney accepts the shorter Lukan text: few, however, would agree with his explanation of why Luke refrained from giving the full words of institution, namely because of his desire to guard a cult secret. Paul had no qualms of secrecy, and Mark, writing before Luke, gives the words in full.

Mr. Leaney's translation of the text of the gospel calls for no general comment excepting to say that he reduces the language of the gospel to the commonplace. His

endeavour to get rid of archaisms is often unfortunate and unnecessary: for example 'see' for 'behold'; 'feeding-trough' for 'manger'; 'lodging-house' for 'inn'; 'bread set out' for 'shewbread', which latter incidentally he used on p. 185; 'letter-hook' for 'tittle'. 'Come on' may be what Yorkshire shepherds would say when summoned by angels, but it is hardly the language of Bethlehem. Ugly jingles such as in 'the turn of his course' is more appropriate to the Jolly Miller than to Zacharias, and 'this one too was with him' and 'a gainsaid sign' hardly help in the better understanding of 'the difficulties of translating the original New Testament'. Why 'caravanserai' in II:44, and why 'tax-collectors' for 'publicans' three times, and 'taxgatherers' five times? Even Luke was consistent here.

In the commentry on the text, Mr. Leaney is somewhat eclectic both in what he chooses to comment on, and in his comments. Obviously in a commentary of this kind one would hardly expect the fullness of treatment given in more exhaustive works, but many extremely important passages are either altogether ignored or the comments are inadequate. However, much of what Mr. Leaney does give us is thought provoking and scholarly; though one cannot help feeling that what Luke gains as theologian at Mr. Leaney's hands, he loses as an historian. There is an error in the chapter enumeration on page 227.

L. B. Cross

## ANGLICANISM, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE[1]

It is a great pity that Dr. Winnett's book was not published earlier. It would have been invaluable had it been available when bodies connected with the Church of England were giving evidence before the Royal Commission on Marriage and Divorce and when the Convocations were discussing the question of the re-marriage of divorced persons in church. Not that the book produces new evidence on the subject or develops a particular thesis in relation to the present situation. What it does do is to give the whole of the relevant facts and opinions from the Reformation to the present day with regard to the teaching and practice of the Church of England in respect of divorce and re-marriage. No one henceforth will have the right to enter the lists on this subject without having read Dr. Winnett's book.

The book is not written in an entertaining style, but that is of no importance, the subject-matter is of interest for itself, and the author presents his evidence in an unbiassed, impartial manner which gives full weight to it, and it is only on the last page that he reveals his own opinion in a way which is in sharp contrast to the whole bearing of his book.

The period falls naturally into four divisions:

(i) The Reformation period up to the Canons of 1604;
(ii) The seventeenth century;
(iii) From 1700 to 1857;
(iv) From 1857 to the present day.

The writer deals with what he calls the indissolubilist and the non-indissolubilist positions in each. It is a pity that he chose such awkward terms to describe the opposing points of view, but they are non-committal, and it may be said at once that what emerges from the book is the wide acceptance of the non-indissolubilist position throughout the post-Reformation period. The official mind may have been expressed in Prayer Book, Canons and Church Courts, but the views of individuals and the practice of Bishops and clergy gave expression to the more charitable liberal view.

[1] *Divorce and Remarriage in Anglicanism*, by A. R. Winnett. (Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 30/-.)

In the first period 'the *Reformatio Legum,* with its proviso for the dissolution of the marriage-bond for adultery, desertion and serious cruelty, undoubtedly reflected the opinion of an influential section within the Church of England at the time of its compilation, and a still larger body of opinion would have regarded the one cause of adultery as dissolving the bond and thereby enabling the re-marriage of at least the innocent party' (p. 52). Bishop Andrews and Edmund Bunny bear witness to the fact that second marriages took place at the time when they wrote.

For the second period Dr. Winnett groups his authorities under the two heads, showing equal weight of opinion on either side. The inconclusiveness of the debate springs naturally from the reliance placed upon the words of Holy Scripture and the impossibility of reconciling the text in St. Matthew with other passages. Two short chapters are inserted dealing with the views of Archbishop Laud and Bishop Cosin. Laud's attitude was inconsistent, wavering from one side to the other, but Bishop Cosin, in the Roos case, considered the New Testament evidence and that of the Fathers and early Councils, and concluded that divorce was possible for adultery and that subsequent re-marriage was permissible. Though the manner in which Cosin handled his evidence has been criticised, the authority of his name lent considerable weight to the arguments of those who supported the right of re-marriage after divorce for adultery.

In the eighteenth century the questions of marriage and divorce came to occupy a small, and almost insignificant place in theological controvery. 'The eighteenth century saw the almost complete disappearance from the Church of England of the indissolubilist position regarding marriage' (p. 119).

> 'The right of re-marriage after divorce, refused by the Ecclesiastical Courts, but granted by the parliamentary Divorce Acts which became increasingly frequent, was accepted without protest by the Church, and the authority attaching to the name of Bishop Cosin was doubtless influential in overcoming the hesitations which some churchmen must surely have felt. Moreover, the schism of the Non-Jurors may well have had the effect of removing from the Church many of those most likely to have upheld the indissolubilist position.'

The Bishops made no protest or opposition to these Bills, and 'apart from the one case of adulterer and paramour the right of re-marriage after divorce was unquestioned' (p. 129).

> 'Practically all Churchmen were agreed that marriage was dissoluble for adultery and that the innocent party might marry again, and some would have gone further and not denied a similar right to the guilty party. As we have seen the re-marriage of guilty parties after parliamentary divorce did take place with the Church's acquiescence if not with her approval' (p. 133).

That was the position when the movement for Divorce Reform began in 1850, culminating in the Act of 1857. In the debates in the House of Lords the differences of views among the Bishops was clearly displayed. They were divided also in their attitude towards the clause inserted by the Commons which allowed a clergyman to refuse to conduct the re-marriage of a divorced person, but compelled him to allow the use of his church if another minister within the diocese was willing to officiate.

This division of opinion has continued from 1857 to the present day. Two factors have, however, emerged which profoundly affected the Church's position. The first was modern Biblical Criticism, which undermined the literalist attitude towards the texts and so opened the door to new ways of approaching the problem. The discussion then ranged over the question as to whether Jesus was legislating or setting forward an ideal; was the Church bound unalterably by His words, or had it the authority to adapt the principle set out by Him to meet special circumstances?

The second factor has been the revival of the meetings of Convocation and the holding of Lambeth Conferences. It was inevitable that both these bodies should regard it as their duty to express their opinions upon matters of deep interest, and marriage and divorce were obviously subjects on which they were tempted to pronounce judgement. Dr. Winnett carefully traces the route through the various discussions and pronouncements of these bodies and arrives at the conclusion that 'there is a general realisation that the Church must adopt a uniform practice and that the Resolutions embodied in the recent Act of Convocation represent the nearest approach to a common mind which the Church is likely to reach' (p. 247). Coming at the end of a work which has clearly demonstrated the differences of opinion and practice which have existed in the Church of England since the Reformation, the author's personal view appears a complete *tour de force*. '. . . the Church's concessions in discipline must clearly *not* (this word has been accidentally omitted) be allowed to undermine the integrity of her witness' (p. 276).

The author points out the limited outlook from which the subject is generally approached, namely the interpretation of a few scriptural texts and the citation of historical precedents. It has been legal and canonical rather than *theological*. It is into that wider setting that the discussion needs to be led to-day. A majority vote by Convocation cannot be identified with the infallible utterance of the Church. Its opinions are of no legal effect, and the weight attached to them must depend upon the soundness on the grounds upon which they are based. Those who reject the utterances by Convocation on the subject of marriage and divorce do so because they consider the grounds on which they are founded to be unsound, scripturally, morally, historically and legally. The Resolutions of Convocation cannot therefore be regarded as the final word. The whole subject needs re-consideration.

What, for example, constitutes a valid marriage? Dr. Winnett does not consider this question; no doubt he regarded it as outside his terms of reference. Yet it is fundamental. Dr. Winnett quotes Dr. Kirk (on p. 133)—'the essence of marriage, as regards its form, consists in the exchange of vows before accredited witnesses, not in the presence or words of a priest as such, nor in the blessing of the Church'. This point has never been followed out by our authorities.

The persistence of the Church in following the resolutions of Convocation is bound to lead to a head-on clash with the authority of the State in Parliament, and in that conflict the Church will not be able to rely upon the support of the laity in this matter. That is why we urge the necessity of a reconsideration of the question; in that task Dr. Winnett's book will be of great service.

The number of books on the way to accomplish a happy marriage is steadily growing, and this book[2] is one which we would put into the hands of any couple contemplating matrimony with the utmost confidence. Dr. David Mace gives an account of the author in a Foreword. Dr. Theodore Bovet is a Swiss physician with a wide comprehension of the significance of modern psychology, drawn to the study of marital problems by his clinical experience. A man of deep religious faith he sought to bring the insights of philosophy and theology to bear upon his task, and his skill as a marriage counsellor is widely known throughout his own country and beyond. The book deals with the physical and psychological aspects of marriage in a direct, simple, and interesting way. It discusses some of the problems which lie before young married couples, and emphasises the part which religion and God's grace must play in the attainment of a perfect married relationship.

We cannot believe, however, that the ordinary young man or woman will derive

[2] *A Handbook to Marriage and Marriage Guidance*, by Theodor Bovet. (Longmans, Green & Co., 12/6.)

much guidance from another book.[3] The writer draws a distinction between Christian love and romantic love and uses the poetry of Charles Williams and the experience of mystics in the attempt to show how romantic love can become Christian love. The use of symbolical creations like Mother Kirk and of peculiar terms like twynature does not commend the book to popular reading. Since he admits that second marriages may fulfil the 'pattern' where a first has failed it is difficult to see how Mother Kirk can deny their validity.

T.J.W.

## MYTH AND RITUAL IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST*

The latest product of Professor E. O. James's inexhaustible fertility is this masterly survey of a vast and intricate subject in a comparatively short book. There are both drawbacks and advantages in the treatment of such a subject on such a scale. The advantages are that it enables the non-specialist reader, for whom this book is clearly intended, to get a bird's-eye view of the country; to see its proportions and the relation of its different parts to one another. It is like a map of the world on Mercator's projection, where the relative positions of the continents can be clearly seen. This is a service which only a scholar with an encyclopaedic grasp of the subject could render, and this Professor James has done. The disadvantage, inevitable in such a panoramic survey, is that, especially in the case of ritual, minute details are often of decisive importance, and it is not possible to discuss details in so broad a treatment. To take one example: in his account of kingship rituals in Israel Professor James is unable to allow himself more than three pages, and the reader who wishes to be enlightened on the question of a New Year enthronement festival of Yahweh at Jerusalem, such as Mowinckel has put forward, and A. R. Johnson and Widengren have developed along different lines, will not find what he looks for here. This is not because the learned author is not perfectly aware that such ritual problems exist, as his footnotes, relegated to the end of the book, abundantly demonstrate, but because his scale of treatment will not permit of their discussion.

One great merit of Professor James's approach to the whole subject is his recognition of the importance of diffusion and culture-contacts. He has shown clearly, for example, that the many striking resemblances between Greek and Semitic myths are due, not to any tendency of the primitive mind to produce similar myths under similar circumstances, but to the many opportunities which the Mediterranean littoral afforded for culture-contacts, and for the exchange, not only of artefacts, but of ideas. The myth of Cadmus represents the well-established fact that the Greek alphabet derives from the early Phoenician alphabetic script carried westward by Phoenician traders; and long ago Sir Arthur Evans said that we can see the bull-cult borne to Crete from Asia Minor.

Another feature to be welcomed is Professor James's firm rejection of the myth of the mythopoeic faculty, a myth which even so good a scholar as the late Professor Henri Frankfort has succumbed to in his contribution to the symposium, *The Intellectual Adventure of Ancient Man*. To explain the origin of myths among so-called 'primitive peoples' by a mythopoeic faculty is simply tautology. It amounts to saying that primitive peoples invent myths because they have a faculty of inventing myths. Neither will Professor James admit that such true myths as the creation-myth

[3] *The Pattern of Love*, by William P. Wylie. (Longmans, Green & Co., 16/-.)

**Myth and Ritual in the Ancient Near East*. By E. O. James. (Thames & Hudson, London, 1958. Pp. 352. Price 35s. net.)

are the product of intellectual curiosity or speculative thought. He recognizes that the ritual myth, which is probably the earliest form of myth, has invariably a practical purpose. It re-enacts an original situation of vital significance to the community in order to secure its continuance. The myth is inseparable from the ritual; it describes in spoken words which have magical force the situation which the ritual enacts. In his book, *Christian Myth and Ritual,* published in 1933, Professor James showed that he was already thinking along the lines which have resulted in the present book. In his preface to that book he said: 'With the progress of rational thought, the control of nature by magico-religious means has lost its significance, but there remains a point in the age-long quest for Reality, and the satisfaction of fundamental religious needs, where abstract ratiocanation and conceptual thinking can go no further. It then becomes necessary to fall back on myth and ritual as a representation of Ultimate Reality in its qualitative aspect.'

One small oversight should be pointed out, in the hope that the omission can be remedied in a future edition. On p. 10 in the table of contents there appears the entry, 'Chart, between 310 and 311', but on turning hopefully to the pages indicated, the reader will find nothing but a blank page.

We are deeply indebted to Professor James for this magnificent exposition of the way in which the whole complicated pattern of myth and ritual has developed throughout the ages in the ancient Near-East.

S.H.H.

## THE MASS AND THE REFORMATION[1]

Professor Dugmore's book has a double aim, to show that in the controversies of the Reformation the evidence of tradition, so far as eucharistic doctrine was concerned, was not unreasonably used against mediaeval innovations, and to establish the relative independence of the English Reformers, at least to the extent of showing that their chief leaders made their own judgements on the basis of Scripture and the Fathers, and did not blindly follow the Swiss. In his first two chapters he makes much use of Roman Catholic writing on the history of eucharistic doctrine, especially of Batiffol's studies on the Augustinian and Ambrosian traditions, and of the more recent work of Père J. de Ghellinck and Père de Lubac, for instance in the latter's *Corpus Mysticum*. But I think he makes too complete an identification between the doctrine of transubstantiation developed in the twelfth century, and that imposed by Cardinal Humbert in the recantation of Berengar in 1059. The Reformers found this recantation in the *Decretum* of Gratian,[2] and treated it as the standard conservative interpretation of the real presence, neglecting the subtleties of the schoolmen, against whom they were in reaction, and to whom Professor Dugmore may not be entirely just. Rejecting this, they fell back on what appeared to them to be the true doctrine of St. Augustine and the other Fathers, but it was almost impossible for them to understand this in its historical perspective. The difference between the English and the Swiss Reformers had probably less to do with a different understanding of the Fathers, or even a different emphasis on their importance, than Professor Dugmore would have us suppose, and more to do with a difference in their political and social circumstances.

The first two English Prayer Books were both compiled by Reformers to be used by parish priests whose general outlook was still that of 'the old learning'. Professor

[1] *The Mass and the English Reformers,* by C. W. Dugmore. (Macmillan, 30/-.)

[2] Deconsecr., dist. 2, *c.* 42.

Dugmore rightly emphasizes the anxiety of the Reformers lest the Prayer Book of 1549 should be a cover for the continuation of a religious practice substantially the same as of old, and also the important differences between the Prayer Book of 1552 and other liturgies used in England and abroad by groups in complete sympathy with the Swiss. But I think he exaggerates the conformity of the First Prayer Book to the old order, especially in the *anamnesis,* and neglects possible mediaeval antecedents of the rearrangement of the canon in 1552, putting what is left of the *anamnesis* before the narrative of the institution. In the *Rationale* of Durandus, which (as he observes in a footnote)[3] was thoroughly studied by Cranmer, is a quotation from the *De sacro altaris mysterio* of Pope Innocent III: 'It seems therefore that in respect of the order of the eucharistic consecration the section beginning: *qui pridie quam pateretur,* ought to have been placed at the end of the canon'. The Pope went on to explain that 'what follows is understood as going before'.[4]

Professor Dugmore is less concerned with the eucharistic sacrifice than with the real presence, and this seems to me a defect in his otherwise valuable book, which is of immediate importance in relation to the recommendations of the committee on Prayer Book Revision of the Lambeth Conference for 'the recovery of the worship of the primitive Church' in accordance with the ideals of the Reformers. Two questions arise: (1) How far can any group of scholars succeed in reconstructing that worship? For instance on the important question of the place of the *epiclesis* in the liturgy of Hippolytus, the textual evidence appears to be in conflict with conclusions derived at the present time by most liturgical scholars in England from general considerations of theological history, and these may still be challenged. (2) While we may reasonably hold that the worship of the Church in the days of frequent communion is a better model for us than the worship of the Middle Ages, do we want to restore everything described by Hippolytus and Tertullian? An historical approach is characteristic of our tradition, but it needs to be pursued on a sufficiently wide basis to avoid romanticism. On issues relating to the eucharistic sacrifice the Reformers were fighting on fronts where quotations from early writers could give them little positive assistance. Some of those issues may be dead, but some are still sufficiently alive to influence our deliberations in liturgical matters, as they certainly did theirs. Even if they had known much more than they did about the Church of the Fathers, they would still have been obliged to say and do things for which no patristic precedent could be provided. And so are we.

GEORGE EVERY, S.S.M.

## A TALENTED ARCHBISHOP

Mr. Bromley's study of Archbishop Trench[1] is a welcome addition to the numerous biographies of eminent Victorian ecclesiastics which have recently appeared. For eminent Trench certainly was, even though he may be generally forgotten to-day. He was a prolific writer on a wide variety of subjects, so much so that his books are still often to be seen in second-hand bookshops, and some of them should still have their place at least in the parson's library as well. In fact Trench deserves to be remembered, if not as a poet, a philologist and theologian, and an architect of the disestablished Irish Church, yet as a nineteenth century High Churchman who was entirely unaffected by the Oxford Movement. In contrast to the Tractarians, who so

[3] P. 115, n. 3.

[4] *Patrologia Latina* 217, *c.* 888. On p. 135, following Brightman, Professor Dugmore notes a possible influence of this treatise on the Prayer Book of 1549.

[1] *The Man of Ten Talents,* by J. Bromley. (S.P.C.K. 1959, 25/-.)

frequently devoted their patristic learning to the cause of ecclesiastical controversy, Trench showed in his *Notes on the Parables* (which appeared almost contemporaneously with Tract 90, in 1841) how much more profitably such patristic knowledge could be used for the purposes of biblical exegesis. Indeed, *Notes on the Parables* proved to be Trench's most popular work, running through fourteen editions in his lifetime, and continuing to be reprinted for a quarter of a century afterwards. It was his first major work and typical of what was to follow.

> 'In a period of bitter controversies Trench never wasted time in writing a controversial pamphlet or preaching a controversial sermon. He was always a scholar and a gentleman, which some disciples of the Oxford Movement unhappily were not.' (*The Man of Ten Talents,* p. 83).

On the other hand it is on record that he 'violently opposed' the admission of Bishop Colenso to the Athenaeum, but perhaps that was only an isolated instance.

Trench obviously owed much, as Mr. Bromley makes clear, to his singularly gifted mother whose literary remains he eventually published. Her death while Trench was still an undergraduate at Cambridge so unsettled him that he nearly made shipwreck of his life soon afterwards by joining in a madcap scheme to bring about a revolution in Spain. One of his friends was actually shot by the Spanish authorities, but fortunately Trench got no further than Gibraltar and then sensibly decided to return home to marriage and ordination. In after life he would never speak of this youthful escapade and for liberalism of any kind he never again evinced the slightest sympathy.

For nearly twenty-five years Trench pursued the uneventful life of a literary clergyman, combining for many of them the duties of a small country parish with a professorship at King's College, London. Then came his preferment to the Deanery of Westminster for which (as for his subsequent appointment to Dublin) he was indebted to his friendship with Samuel Wilberforce whose 'friendly engines', Trench gratefully acknowledges, had 'so often been set in motion to bring about such a result'. Whether he might not have reached high preferment more speedily without this assistance is a matter for conjecture, but the deanery of Westminster was a place obviously well suited to his literary accomplishments and Trench was no doubt quite sincere in telling Wilberforce: 'The position is more than I ever looked for . . . as much as ever I desire'. Seven years later, when his name was being canvassed for Dublin, he begged Wilberforce 'to do nothing to bring about such a consummation. Let it come unsought, as by me it is undesired'.

Nevertheless the scholar-poet of Westminster was presently made Primate of Ireland, and Wilberforce confided to one of his intimates:

> 'If we were sitting under that beech tree at Lavington I might whisper to you of the curious under-history of Trench's appointment to the Archbishopric, with which neither Palmerston nor Lord Carlisle can claim authorship' (p. 153).

Curious undoubtedly it was, for apart from his Anglo-Irish descent Trench had no special qualifications or aptitude for a post of such exceptional difficulty. And in fact he proved strangely blind to the troubles by which the Irish Church was encompassed until the crisis of disestablishment burst upon him. Yet in some ways this was Trench's finest hour. Whatever the right and wrongs of the controversy, neither Wilberforce nor Gladstone himself emerge from it very creditably. Wilberforce fully expected that Trench would seek his help as a mediator and hoped that this would turn out to his own advantage; Gladstone, looking round for some sop with which to appease the seething discontent of Ireland, suddenly saw in the removal of the Establishment 'the disappearance of a national, almost a world-wide, reproach'. Against this background of pious humbug and pious self seeking Trench's

firm and persistent refusal to parley stands out with a singular nobility. Despite all that he owed to Wilberforce he told him plainly that he would neither accept his offers of mediation nor consider the possibility of his own translation to some safer and smoother anchorage—even though he was not indifferent to the loss of 'the little external dignities' that disestablishment would involve.

> 'It is my deepest conviction', he told Wilberforce, 'that nothing *would*, as I am sure nothing ought to, induce me to leave my post here. When the ship is in among the breakers nothing should induce a chief officer to quit it. I do not say this as supposing that I can be of much help in our coming time of trouble, but I feel that my place is here; and if in times past I have studied too much a literary ease, nothing is juster than that in these latter years of my life, when I might be looking for some quiet, there should be before me all which only too plainly I see' (p. 180).

In the years that followed this same firmness had a restraining influence upon the disestablished Church, and it is likely that Trench contributed more to its ultimate well-being than either he himself or others at the time realized. Disestablishment seems always to result in a narrowing of churchmanship; Trench was fully aware of this unfortunate tendency and did his best to minimize it.

> 'For myself', he said, 'I can only say that I would sooner cease from the office which I hold than become the ignoble instrument of narrowing the limits of our Church and making untenable the position of many of its most earnest and devoted children' (p. 197).

Once again we may notice here the wide difference in his outlook from that of many of the Oxford school who would have welcomed disestablishment in England.

It is a pity, perhaps, that Mr. Bromley did not devote a larger part of his book to the Dublin period; nevertheless in *The Man of Ten Talents* he has given us a most useful and interesting portrait. Naturally there are occasions when he may provoke our disagreement: for example (*à propos* of Trench's *Notes on the Miracles*), is it really true to say that 'a Christian's belief in the divinity of Christ is *wholly* (italics mine) founded upon the Resurrection?' (p. 98). And great and gifted though Trench undoubtedly was the title of the book does seem to claim rather too much for him.

Unfortunately several mistakes and sideslips have been allowed to go uncorrected. Thus, the Coronation in 1821 was, of course, that of George IV, not William IV (p. 19); the allusion quoted from the Memoirs of Bishop Bathurst (p. 47) is to a Mr. French, not Trench; the date of *Essays and Reviews* was 1860, not 1861, and it was H. B. Wilson, not Rowland Williams, who was subsequently prosecuted for his views on eternal punishment (p. 119); the diocese of London does not have two cathedrals (p. 141); and Henry Alfred (p. 216) is presumably Henry Alford, Dean of Canterbury. There are several other misprints as well. Nor do we need to be told twice over, in almost identical words (pp. 90, 136), that Trench's church at Itchenstoke no longer exists to-day.

D. L. Scott

## THE MINISTRY OF WOMEN*

This is an able, timely, and thought-provoking book. Miss Thrall has rendered a great service by presenting us with such a carefully reasoned, fair, objective statement of the theological arguments for the ordination of women to the ministry. In her introductory chapter she clears the ground by explaining why—in her opinion—this question ought to be raised: first, because the question of the ordination of women

**The Ordination of Women to the Priesthood*, by M. E. Thrall. (Studies in Ministry and Worship.) (S.C.M. Press, 8/6.)

is not a feminist, but a theological question; second and springing from this, because it is a question of vocation; and third, because, up to the present, no satisfactory answer, based on biblical grounds, has been given to the question: why may women not be ordained?

Her main argument is based upon a scholarly examination of this question in the light of the whole purpose of God in Creation and Redemption. Though we may not always be convinced by some of her reasoning on points of detail, her contention that the Old Testament must be studied in the light of the New—since the Bible is a unity—is illuminating when applied to the status of women in the Church. She shows that the two Creation stories in Genesis 1 and 2 differ from each other in a significant way. In Genesis 1 the man and the woman are 'created simultaneously by the Word of God', while in Genesis 2 'the woman is created after the man, and is formed from him'. Thus in the first story the woman has 'an independent existence in the Image of God, which does not depend upon her connection with the man'; in Genesis 2 however, the woman 'does not exist in the Image in her own right, but only by virtue of her connection with, and her dependence upon, the man'.

In the light of the New Creation, wrought by God in Christ, both these creation stories receive a fuller meaning. The first 'corresponds with God's new, decisive, once-for-all creative act in the believer's baptism into Christ' (cf. Gal. 3:28 and II Cor. 3:18). This means that men and women alike are re-created in the Image of God through the Sacrifice of Christ and the power of the Holy Spirit. This is the fundamental fact of the being of man, God-given and indestructible. The story in Genesis 2, on the other hand, 'corresponds with those verses in the New Testament which speak of the believer's growth in the life in Christ, and of his progressive appropriation of the results of God's action'.

Noting the implications of these two stories (which run right through the Bible as a whole) Miss Thrall reminds us that, 'theologically speaking', women were not really members of Israel at all. Further, in rabbinic Judaism women were under no obligation to keep the Law. Apparently all that the woman had to do was to 'hear the lesson from the Torah, but the practice of it she must forgo. Women, slaves and children are not to pray the Shema'. 'Rabbi Meir calls upon man to give daily thanks to God for having made him not a pagan, not a woman, and not a fool'. And another Rabbi declared that 'a heathen and a woman are incapable of receiving instruction' (p. 45). That is: women were in the same category as aliens or Gentiles.

But in the doctrine of Redemption, in the New Israel, not only Gentiles, but women, are no longer 'strangers from the covenants of promise'; they too are included in the new humanity which God has created through Christ. (Eph. 2:11-22). Through Baptism and the gift of the Spirit, women as well as Gentiles are henceforth an integral part of the new Israel, the 'household of God'. They have the same freedom, and the same responsibility, for the life, worship, and mission of the Church.

This suggests, as the writer points out, that just as Gentiles came to be accepted into the Early Church, after the incident of Cornelius (Acts 10), which showed that there are times when the Holy Spirit 'does act apart from, and as it were without the prior consent of the Church', in order 'to establish for Christ's people some new principle of action' (p. 9). So now, in our present situation, and not in some indefinite future, ought not the Church to take account of the 'calling of women to the priesthood as a fact?' To the present reviewer, not only should this question be *asked*: it requires an answer—and an answer which at least accepts the principle that 'the Lord hath yet more light and truth to break forth from His Word'. For this is not only a question of 'women priests'; it is a question for the life of the Church in the widest sense: for it vitally affects the apostolic mission of the Church throughout the

world, especially where in so many lands, including our own country, 'the hungry sheep look up and are not fed'.

This book deserves a wide circulation among clergy and laity alike.

OLIVE WYON

## THE COUNTRY CLERGY IN ELIZABETHAN AND STUART TIMES*

The history of the Church as an institution, its growth, its political fortunes, its ups and downs in popularity, have been studied fully enough. It is a welcome change that far more attention is now being given to the ordinary day to day life of the Church and its ministers. Some day the equivalent of a social history of the Church will be written. Whoever does it will be greatly indebted to Dr. Tindal Hart, who is uncovering a great deal of the material which would have to go into such a work. In two previous volumes he has dealt with the country parson in the nineteenth and in the eighteenth centuries. He now studies him in Elizabethan and Stuart times. The result is interesting, but, it must be admitted, rather depressing. Neglected buildings, delinquent clergy, pluralities and problems abound. Perhaps, as Dr. Hart draws it, there is too much black in the picture. Offenders are far more likely to get their names into ecclesiastical records, whence the industrious historian can dig them out, than the decent men who plod on day after day doing their duty faithfully and drawing upon themselves neither special praise nor special blame. Yet they are by far the larger part of the clergy in every generation, and, if the oblivion which overtakes the commonplace makes it hard to describe their lives in detail, they must certainly be borne in mind when reading such a book as this. It is perhaps a little old-fashioned to draw morals from history, but the obvious one here is that discipline which is not willingly accepted is rarely successful. So much that is unseemly has come from the attempt to coerce men who, rightly or wrongly, were unwilling to accept what was being thrust upon them. And yet a corporate body must have some semblance of order within it. How is that to be achieved? There is a problem to challenge the statesmanship of all parties. Dr. Hart's book is factual, well documented and easy to read. If it rubs a little of the romance off the past, it at least assures us that our problems are no greater than those of our ancestors.

C. J. STRANKS

## A THEOLOGY OF ELECTION (ISRAEL AND THE CHURCH)*

'What is Israel? Which is the People of God?' The author, who is himself a Hebrew-Christian, has his own answer to such questions, for which he claims the authority of St. Paul for whom 'the Israel of God is Jew and Gentile on a footing of equality in the Messiah', Jesus of Nazareth crucified, risen and ascended. To call the Jews the 'chosen' race is theologically a misconception. 'Because grace is given and cannot be taken, not every one of Israel is Israel. . . . In this tension between being called and being chosen, the Jew stands, the Church stands, man stands.' The history of historic Israel, Israel according to the flesh, is the story of that tension.

**The Country Clergy in Elizabethan and Stuart Times.* By Rev. A. Tindal Hart, D.D. (Phoenix House. Pp. 180. 21s.)

**A Theology of Election (Israel and the Church).* By Jakób Jocz, D.Litt., Ph. D., with a Preface by the Rt. Rev. F. D. Coggan, D.D., Bishop of Bradford. (S.P.C.K., London, 1958. Pp. 227. 25s.)

So too is the history of the Church, Israel according to the Spirit. 'Historic Israel is the Church in her religious autonomy before God.' They utter a double lie who say that the Gentiles have accepted Christ and a glib half-truth if they say that the Jews have rejected him. Apologists err in saying that God abandoned the Israel according to the flesh and substituted Israel according to the Spirit, for 'Israel is the people of Israel in all its historic extension, both ante- and post-Christum natum, plus the Church which consists of Jews and Gentiles.' As for 'all Israel (*Rm.* xi, 26), this is the Church of God in her completion in heaven'. This does not imply the total conversion of historic Israel. This view can be held only by 'those who look upon the Kingdom of God as the result of evolution. . . . To us, this is theological nonsense'. Nevertheless, 'though Church and Synagogue stand apart in history, they may yet meet at the end of time at the feet of the coming king' whom the Jews await but the Christian can identify. Only the Christian belongs to the New Age 'at the brink of the end'. All this by the grace of God, not by blood or by Law or by creed or by Church, but 'because God is what he is in Christ Jesus the Saviour of Sinners'. This alone is the explanation of God's choice of both Jews and Gentiles, 'who put themselves under the judgment of God and accept the verdict: Guilty. . . .'

So the long argument may be summarized. It is the fruit of years of searching and is written 'under inward compulsion'. The author feels that Synagogue and Church need each other in order to understand themselves and to conduct dialogue in truth. He is concerned that 'the Gentile Church is in constant danger of forgetting her connection with Israel'; that some Christian scholars 'speak of the Synagogue as the mother of Christianity, implying that rabbinic Judaism is the direct heir and exponent of Biblical revelation'; that they commit the mistake of trying 'to fit Christianity into the framework of Pharisaic Judaism' and so hinder the better understanding of the New Testament and of St. Paul; that both Synagogue and Church 'on no other point have compromised to such an extent as on the question of revelation. . . . For the Church this is nothing less than a betrayal of her purposes. . . . The concept of progressive revelation was invented . . . it carries an inner contradiction when applied to the Christian faith'. If Dr. Jocz is right, there may be salutary surprises in store for those who do really 'go back' to the Old Testament. They would do well to take Dr. Jocz along with them. He has written for the edification of all students of both Old and New Testaments a book of rare quality out of rare experience as Jew and Christian.

It seemed best to let Dr. Jocz speak for himself. The only comment I would dare to add is this: there is, I think, indirect evidence in the Talmud that the rabbis asked themselves why 'God chose . . . '. In their attempts to determine the meaning of the common Hebrew word translated 'choose', they distinguish according as the 'choice' is made by God or by men. If the former they interpret it by using a later (Aramaic) word meaning 'to take pleasure in' (see *BDB Lexicon*, p. 946 b, and the earlier, more usual word *ib*, p. 953 a). The emphasis is on God's good pleasure, so that he 'chose' because he delighted in, wanted, as e.g. 'He chose the tribe of Judah, the Mount Zion which he loved' (*Ps.* lxxviii, 68). This comparatively harmless notion is not quite what Dr. Jocz means when he ascribes election to God's will. But it is not without relevance to any discussion of the Biblical concept of Election.

T. Fish

## MATTER, MIND AND MAN.*

Dr. Sinnott has been Director of the Sheffield Scientific School at Yale, and is now Dean Emeritus of the Graduate School. In this book he is appealing to those who may not be satisfied with religious orthodoxy, but who also reject purely materialistic explanations of man and the universe. It is his deep conviction that 'only in God can man be fulfilled'.

As a biologist he rejects the mechanistic interpretation of the data, and although he also rejects 'vitalism', his insistence on 'organization' has more affinities with the latter. On page 37, for example, he speaks of 'this tendency for development to march on to a definite goal' . . . 'Often the restoration of a lost part or a disorganized pattern may be attained by different routes, as though the final goal and not the means of reaching it were the important thing.' . . . 'Something representative of the whole organism, so to speak, is present in every cell and guides the cell to make its necessary contribution to the whole.'

But on page 50 he tells us that 'whether the attainment of the goal is advantageous or not is quite irrelevant'. And from page 52 one gathers that although he rejects mechanism and insists on some sort of unconscious teleology so far as the development of *individual* organisms is concerned, he is not sure whether teleology can be observed in the *long-term* evolutionary process, i.e. whether the advantageous developments have been *purposefully* selected or whether the whole business has been the work of Natural Selection. Since neither chance nor mechanistic causation can account for individual organisms, it would be very curious if blindly causal Natural Selection could account entirely for the evolution of the species. It is interesting to compare Dr. Sinnott on this point with the thesis of Professor Graham Cannon's *The Evolution of Living Things* (Manchester University Press, 1958). The latter produces a wealth of examples of the truth of Lamarck's contention that if there is a pressing and sustained need for organisms to develop a certain organ, it will gradually be produced (page 65).

It would be unfair to criticise a biologist for writing a book on mind and matter from the biological standpoint. But the reader should bear in mind that the biologist's approach to this general subject is a departmental one, and that some of his conclusions are more or less involved in the uncriticized assumptions from which his science, because it *is* science and not philosophy, begins. For example, he writes: 'That the mental grows out of the developmental and that the two are aspects of the same protoplasmic process is obviously an idea of great importance for reaching an understanding of what man is' (page 49). But the idea of 'the mental' as somehow 'produced' by an earlier protoplasmic process is inherent in the biological standpoint. The biologist, as such, takes for granted at the outset a three-dimensional world-in-itself in a common objective time and he *must* therefore try to 'explain' a 'later' mental in terms of an 'earlier' non-mental. But this whole standpoint is open to the gravest objection from the philosophical standpoint, to say nothing of Special Relativity. The basic fact is one's own existence as a conscious being, and there is much to be said for the view that the language of the impersonal sciences is 'as if' or 'fictional'. We should bear this in mind when we read, on page 26, that 'Man is basically a biological problem. The questions we shall have finally to answer about him are biological questions.' He suggests here that the key to all philosophical problems lies in the study of biology, although later (page 64) he admits that 'any phenomenon . . . should be studied not only in its simplest manifestations but in its most complex ones'. But does not this admission mean that the key to the

**Matter, Mind and Man.* By Edmund W. Sinnott. (George Allen & Unwin, 1958. 18s.)

problem of man is to be found in human history rather than in biology? Long ago Aristotle saw that the true nature of a process is revealed only in its later stages. The naturalistic bias in favour of 'explaining' everything by its origins has been the curse of European and American thought since the publication of *The Origin of the Species*.

Dr. Sinnott believes that within the framework of the general concept of 'organization' it will be possible for detailed laws to be discovered. But it is a little difficult to see what detailed laws there *could* be, other than a catalogue of particular exemplifications of Professor Graham's general thesis that organisms have an innate capacity for developing in required directions.

To say, however, that the ultimate problems of the nature of man are not *fundamentally* biological is not to say that the biologist, as such, has no contribution to make. He should be read with respect, particularly when, as in the case of Dr. Sinnott, he gives proof of having read widely and thought deeply outside his specialized subject. There is much that is valauble in the philosophical parts of this book, and the breadth of his vision is seen on page 98, when he writes that the soul 'might even be the *primary* reality, a part of the creative spirit of the universe, and one may think of the body not as its precursor but as its product'. He has, too, some wise things to say about the impossibility of accounting for *moral* evolution by natural selection. He argues ably for a reconciliation, or a synthesis, of the opposing theses of orthodoxy and humanism—the Fall and Original Sin on the one hand, and optimistic humanism on the other.

F. H. Cleobury

## AFFIRMATIONS*

This small book of less than 200 pages, although its style makes it sometimes difficult to read, deserves high commendation, being the fruit of bold inspiration, sincerity and relevant to the times.

It is a difficult book simply because it is a translation which is in close accord with the original Italian text, rhetorical in style, abounding with sentences which sometimes cover as much as half a page. Bishop Stephen Neill has done it with care and understanding. To judge from its English dress the original expresses a train of thought which is always fluid in language of an almost poetic kind, with shadows and half-tones hinting at the deepest truths of the Christian faith.

The book is also difficult because its author might be described as a post-Barthian liberal. Hence it is impossible to follow with critical appreciation some of the complicated threads of his theological argument without knowing something of the theological outlook of the author of the famous *Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans* and (the theological *summa* of the twentieth century), the *Kirkliche Dogmatik* from which the author frequently quotes, and certain passages of which he effectively criticises.

I do not wish however merely to emphasise the difficult nature of a book which is so personal and vigorous in style. It demands more than one reading, and must be given profound study and assimilated slowly if it is to yield up its treasures.

Although it may not be Professor Miegge's express purpose, this *libellus aureus* within its brief compass forms a valuable contribution to what is often misnamed the reconciliation of the Christian message with modern culture. Doubtless the author would object that such a description is too limited, and would say that he never

**Visible and Invisible. Christian Affirmations in a Secular Age*, by Giovanni Miegge. Translated by Stephen Neill. London. (A. R. Mowbray. 1958. In 8vo., xiv-170 pp., 15/- net.)

intended to reconcile Christianity with anything, and that in any case it would be necessary to define this 'modern culture' with which it is to be supposed to be so urgent to reconcile Christianity. This question of terminology is after all secondary. The Swiss professor at Rome is by no means a 'don' who just lives with his books and shuts himself up in his ivory tower. He pursues scientific research and at the same time maintains a live and sympathetic awareness of modern life and its problems. He is remarkably sensitive to contemporary man both inside and outside the Church, to his ways of thinking and feeling. The twelve chapters of this book may be described as a splendid and illuminating meditation on the great themes of the Christian faith expressed in the broadest and most conciliatory terms. There are no confessional polemics: the author exhibits throughout an exemplary spirit of intellectual charity. This meditation from an eminent theologian on this atomic and technological age of ours is never an arid scholastic. The author faces us with problems which are sometimes subtle but are always real and profound. From their very seriousness they force themselves on the attention of the Christian who is conscious of his beliefs and their implications in our secularised age. This meditation is existential in character but free from anguish and fear: it is inspired by a persistent and active desire not to forget or underestimate the problems and difficulties of the modern man whom we will all individually recognise to be ourselves.

In the preface G. Miegge warns the reader that we will not find in the book a rigid systematic study of Christian theology with the traditional principal themes set out in order. Some believers will be somewhat dissatisfied to find that the book contains no arguments stated in strictly theological form with clear and distinct precision based upon the traditional dogmatic formulae. On the other hand some liberal minded readers will find his approach to certain problems forbidding. But the author shows no desire to use logically compelling proofs or wish to force his ideas on the minds of his readers. Although he avoids dogmatism he is ready to recognize that in the theological field the church needs to express its faith with greater rigidity and to employ proofs of a more strictly demonstrative nature than may be allowed to the individual.

This moving book, through which there breathes a burning and serene faith, gives us more than anything else the witness of a man who has undertaken, freely accepting the faith of the Church, to maintain and hold it with his eyes open. Believers and unbelievers who read and reflect upon this book written with such sincerity cannot help but be struck with the strong frankness of these Christian affirmations in these days of anguish and secularisation and accept with gratitude the light it throws on certain aspects of both the difficulties and the assured convictions belonging to the Christian conscience to-day.

E. A. DE MEDNIETA

## NEW TESTAMENT WORDS*

The series of extracts from Kittel's encyclopaedia hardly calls for more than passing notice, excepting to commend them as translations, so well known, and so valuable to scholars of all classes are the original articles. Two manuals of this series, the one on Basileia, the other on Lord, have been translated from the German by the Rev. H. P. Kingdon to whom both praise and gratitude are due for his painstaking labours. The transliteration of Greek words into an English dress is a noble gesture directed towards those who do not read Greek, but apt to be a bit confusing to those who do! Mr. Kingdon has added a few notes and an introduction, all of which are apposite. This series should find a place in every theological library.

L. B. CROSS

**Basileia*, and *Lord*, translated by H. P. Kingdon. (A. & C. Black, 8/6 and 12/6 respectively.)